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Abstract 
 
Recent debates about popular constitutionalism and judicial 
supremacy have focused on the question of who interprets the 
Constitution. This article reframes the debate by asking what legal sources 
courts apply to protect individual rights from government infringement. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, federal courts applied a mix of 
international law, statutes and common law to protect fundamental rights 
and restrain government action. This article uncovers the forgotten history 
of nineteenth century public law litigation. 
Professors Post and Siegel have advocated “policentric 
constitutional interpretation,” wherein the Supreme Court shares authority 
for constitutional interpretation with other actors. By analogy, this article 
introduces the concept of “polymorphous public law litigation.” Under the 
polymorphous model, instead of fixating on constitutional law as the 
dominant public law discourse, courts apply international law, statutes, 
and common law — and occasionally constitutional law — to decide public 
law controversies. The article demonstrates that nineteenth century 
federal courts applied a polymorphous model of public law litigation. 
During the twentieth century, the polymorphous model was 
supplanted by a constitutionalized model of public law litigation, wherein 
courts rely primarily on constitutional law to decide public law cases. The 
process of constitutionalization exacerbated the tension between judicial 
review and popular sovereignty. When the Supreme Court applies 
constitutional law to decide a case, the Court does not merely decide the 
case; it also creates or modifies a legal rule that is not subject to revision 
by legislative majorities. In contrast, when the Court applies other types of 
law, Congress or state legislatures retain the power to modify the 
controlling legal rule. Hence, revival of a polymorphous model would help 
mitigate the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet have sparked a vigorous scholarly debate 
about the merits of judicial supremacy.
1
 To date, that debate has focused primarily 
on the question of who interprets the Constitution.
2
 Is the Supreme Court “the 
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text,”3 as the Court claims? To what extent 
do Congress, the President, and “the people themselves” share the power to 
interpret and enforce the Constitution? 
This article reframes the debate about judicial supremacy by raising a 
different question: what legal sources do courts apply to protect individual rights 
from government infringement? In the modern era we respond, almost reflexively, 
that courts apply the Constitution for this purpose. However, nineteenth century 
federal courts relied primarily on other sources of law, and only occasionally on 
constitutional law, to protect individual rights from government infringement. 
This article recovers the forgotten history of nineteenth century public law 
litigation. In that era, federal courts routinely applied a mix of international law, 
statutes and common law to protect fundamental rights and restrain government 
action. 
How does the history relate to current debates about judicial supremacy? 
To answer that question, let us begin with a definition and some data. This article 
defines the term “public law cases” to comprise litigated cases involving a dispute 
between a private party and a government actor in which the private party alleges 
that the government committed, or threatened to commit, a violation of some 
established legal norm.
4
 Between 1801 and 1864, the Supreme Court applied 
international law in about 42% of the public law cases decided on the merits. 
During that period, the Court applied constitutional law in only about 13% of the 
public law cases decided on the merits. In contrast, between 1954 and 2005, the 
Court applied international law in only about 3% of the public law cases decided 
on the merits, while it applied constitutional law in about 64% of the public law 
cases decided on the merits.
5
 In short, the discourse of public law has changed 
from an international law discourse to a constitutional law discourse. The 
                                                 
1
 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999).  
2
 The literature is vast. For an excellent introduction to the debate, see the symposium in Volume 
92 of the CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, including articles by Larry Kramer, Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, and Frederick Schauer. See also Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. 
Solum, Book Review: Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005). 
3
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). 
4
 The proper definition of “public law cases” is contested. See infra notes 27-32 and 
accompanying text. 
5
 The data in this paragraph is drawn from an original database created by the author. Detailed 
information about the database and data analysis is presented in Part Two. 
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“constitutionalization” of American public law is the process wherein 
constitutional law displaced other sources of law as the dominant public law 
discourse in federal courts. 
There is a deep tension between constitutionalization and the democratic 
commitment to popular sovereignty because constitutionalization transferred 
lawmaking authority from legislatures to federal courts. When the Supreme Court 
applies a statute or international legal rule to decide a case, the Court exercises 
final decision-making authority in that case, but Congress retains the power to 
modify the controlling domestic rule if Congress dislikes the Court’s decision.6 In 
contrast, when the Court applies constitutional law to decide a case, it does not 
merely decide the case; it also creates or modifies a controlling legal rule that is 
not subject to revision by a legislative majority. Hence, the process of 
constitutionalization transferred lawmaking authority from legislative bodies to 
federal courts by generating a legal discourse in which courts decide public law 
cases by applying legal rules that are not subject to revision by ordinary 
legislation. 
 
The Court’s classic decision in Pennoyer v. Neff7 illustrates the effect of 
constitutionalization. Pennoyer involved a default judgment issued by an Oregon 
state court. Neff, the losing defendant in state court, sued Pennoyer in federal 
court to challenge the validity of the default judgment, claiming he “was a non-
resident of the State . . . [who] was not personally served with process, and did not 
appear therein.”8 The state court plaintiff served Neff by publication in a 
newspaper – a service method authorized by statute in Oregon. Despite express 
statutory authorization for service by publication, the Supreme Court held that the 
“judgment recovered in the State court of Oregon against the plaintiff herein . . . 
was without any validity.”9 
 
The Court rested its decision on “two well-established principles of public 
law.”10 First, “that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty 
over persons and property within its territory.” And second, “that no State can 
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its 
territory.”11 The Court cited two international law treatises as authority – Story’s 
                                                 
6
 Congress cannot unilaterally modify the international legal meaning of a rule of international 
law. However, Congress can enact legislation to control the domestic legal application of 
international law. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) [hereinafter, RESTATEMENT THIRD]. 
7
 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
8
 Id. at 719-20. 
9
 Id. at 734. 
10
 Id. at 722. 
11
 Id. 
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treatise on Conflict of Laws, and Wheaton’s treatise on International Law.12 The 
Court also stated: “The international law . . . as it existed among the States in 
1790, was that a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the person of a 
citizen of another, was void within the foreign State, when the defendant had not 
been served with process or voluntarily made defence.”13 In short, the Court held 
that the state court judgment was void because it conflicted with principles of 
international law. 
 
It remains unclear why the Court thought it could apply international law 
to invalidate a state court judgment. One view is that the Court decided Pennoyer 
on state law grounds, using international law to interpret Oregon’s personal 
jurisdiction statute.
14
 An alternative view is that the Court applied international 
law as federal common law.
15
 Regardless, the Court did not apply federal 
constitutional law to nullify the state court judgment.
16
 If one construes Pennoyer 
as a decision interpreting state law, then the Oregon legislature could have 
modified the jurisdictional rule. If one construes Pennoyer as an application of 
                                                 
12
 Id. 
13
 Id. at 730 (quoting D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 176 (1851)). 
14
 Two sentences in Justice Field’s opinion support this interpretation. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 
720. However, the opinion fills more than fifteen pages in U.S. Reports. The main thrust of the 
opinion strongly implies, without expressly holding, that a state jurisdictional statute inconsistent 
with “principles of public law” would be invalid. The conclusion that a state statute is invalid 
could not be based solely on statutory interpretation. 
15
 Scholars have argued that nineteenth century federal courts applied customary international law 
as general common law, not federal common law. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Customary International Law as Federal Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815 (1997). Under the system derived from Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), courts could not 
apply general common law to invalidate a state statute. As indicated above, Justice Field strongly 
implied that a state statute purporting to authorize jurisdiction in excess of territorial limits derived 
from international law would be invalid. Hence, Justice Field may have conceived of those 
territorial limits as something like federal common law, which does preempt conflicting state law. 
 The Court has a long tradition of applying customary international law as federal 
common law to resolve disputes between states. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek 
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in the Supreme 
Court, 1901-1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE 225, 229-31, 247-49 (Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge eds. 2011) [hereinafter, CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE]. In Pennoyer, Justice Field conceived of the central issue as a jurisdictional dispute 
between Oregon (Pennoyer’s home state) and California (Neff’s home state). Thus, insofar as 
Pennoyer suggests that state jurisdictional rules contravening territorial limits derived from 
international law would be invalid, Justice Field was arguably applying customary international 
law as federal common law to resolve a jurisdictional dispute between Oregon and California. 
16
 The Court’s opinion mentions the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Pennoyer, 
95 U.S. at 733. However, the Court did not base its holding on the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the state court judgment at issue in Pennoyer was rendered in February 1866, see id. at 
716, and the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until 1868. 
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federal common law, Congress could have modified the Pennoyer rule.
17
 
Regardless, some legislative body retained the power to authorize state courts to 
exercise jurisdiction in contravention of Pennoyer’s territorial rule. 
 
Later Supreme Court decisions transformed the Pennoyer rule from a 
principle of international law to a federal constitutional rule. In short, the Court 
constitutionalized the Pennoyer rule by linking it to the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause.
18
 The transformation of Pennoyer’s territoriality principle 
from an international rule to a constitutional rule illustrates two general points 
about constitutionalization.
19
 First, constitutionalization has produced numerous 
judge-made constitutional rules that have little basis in the Constitution’s text.20 
The text of the Due Process Clause says nothing about territorial limits on state 
court jurisdiction. Similarly, much of modern constitutional law consists of judge-
made rules that are at best loosely related to the actual constitutional text. 
 
Second, the process of constitutionalization transferred lawmaking power 
from state and federal legislatures to federal courts. In 1878, when the Court 
decided Pennoyer, either Congress, or state legislatures, or both retained the 
power to authorize state courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants in contravention of Pennoyer’s territoriality rule. By 1900, though, 
neither Congress nor state legislatures had the power to legislate contrary to the 
Pennoyer rule because the Court had incorporated that rule into the Due Process 
Clause.
21
 Thus, constitutionalization transferred lawmaking power from 
democratically elected legislatures to unelected federal judges. 
 
Against this background, let us reconsider the question of judicial 
supremacy. Larry Kramer defines judicial supremacy as “the notion that judges 
                                                 
17
 Insofar as federal courts have the power to create federal common law, Congress must be able to 
modify judge-made rules by exercising its Article I powers. The contrary view — that federal 
courts can create common law outside the scope of Congress’ Article I powers — would be 
inconsistent with Article I, which states: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
18
 See, e.g., Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46 (1894); see also Thomas H. Lee and David L. Sloss, 
International Law as an Interpretive tool in the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE, supra note 15, at 124, 151-52. 
19
 Pennoyer is not a “public law” case as defined in this article. See infra notes 27-32 and 
accompanying text. Even so, Pennoyer helps illustrate the impact of constitutionalization because 
the Court’s subsequent personal jurisdiction doctrine transformed Pennoyer’s international rule 
into a constitutional rule. 
20
 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 25 (2008). 
21
 The territorial jurisdiction of federal courts in federal question cases is governed by the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. Congress may authorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction 
beyond the Fourteenth Amendment limits that apply to state courts, but Congress may not 
authorize jurisdiction beyond limits set by the Fifth Amendment. See generally FRIEDMAN, 
LANDERS & COLLINS, THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 126 (2002). 
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have the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their 
decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone.”22 Critics 
contend that judicial supremacy is inconsistent with popular sovereignty.
23
 
Advocates of judicial supremacy acknowledge the tension between judicial 
supremacy and popular sovereignty, but insist that supremacy is necessary to 
promote other important values.
24
 
 
The history of nineteenth century public law litigation, as elucidated in 
this article, illustrates one way to mitigate the tension between judicial supremacy 
and popular sovereignty. Between 1801 and 1864, the Supreme Court resolved 
almost 90% of its public law cases by applying legal norms other than 
constitutional norms. Imagine that modern legal discourse was transformed so 
that litigants framed most of their public law claims as statutory, common law, or 
international law claims, and federal courts decided most public law cases without 
applying constitutional law. In those circumstances, the political salience of 
judicial supremacy would be greatly diminished. Judicial supremacy would 
remain the rule for the small subset of public law cases where courts applied 
constitutional law, but the revised legal discourse would mitigate the tension 
between judicial supremacy and popular sovereignty. Federal courts would decide 
the vast majority of public law cases by applying legal rules that could be revised 
by majority vote in a democratically elected legislature. 
 
Professors Post and Siegel have advocated “policentric constitutional 
interpretation,” wherein authority for constitutional interpretation is divided 
among the Supreme Court, Congress, and other actors.
25
 By analogy, this article 
introduces the concept of “polymorphous public law litigation.” Under the 
polymorphous model, instead of fixating on constitutional law as the dominant 
public law discourse, lawyers and judges invoke and apply treaties, customary 
international law, statutes, common law —  and occasionally constitutional law 
— to litigate and decide public law controversies.26 The article demonstrates that 
nineteenth century federal courts actually applied a polymorphous model of 
public law litigation.  
 
                                                 
22
 KRAMER, supra note 1, at 125. 
23
 See generally TUSHNET, supra note 1; KRAMER, supra note 1.  
24
 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 
CAL L. REV. 1013 (2004) (emphasizing “[t]he rights of minorities . . . criminal defendants, public 
benefits recipients, and others”); Alexander & Solum, supra note 2 (emphasizing “rule of law” 
values and the need for settlement). 
25
 See Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943 (2003). 
26
 Insofar as the polymorphous model would reduce judicial reliance on constitutional law, it is 
similar to Professor Schauer’s concept of the “modest Constitution.” See Frederick Schauer, 
Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (2004). 
Polymorphous Public Law Litigation 
David Sloss, Draft, January 2014 
 
8 
 
Part One sets forth a conceptual framework for the ensuing discussion by 
analyzing the relationship among five key concepts: public law litigation, judicial 
review, judicial supremacy, constitutionalization, and popular sovereignty. Part 
Two presents an empirical analysis of constitutionalization, drawing on an 
original database created by the author. Part Three presents two case studies to 
illustrate the application of a polymorphous model of public law litigation by 
nineteenth century federal courts. Part Four addresses the contemporary feasibility 
and desirability of reversing the process of constitutionalization and reviving a 
polymorphous model of public law litigation. 
 
I 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Part One is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the 
concept of public law litigation. The next section analyzes the relationship 
between judicial review and popular sovereignty. The final section addresses the 
relationship between constitutionalization and judicial supremacy. 
 
A. What is Public Law Litigation? 
 
There is no agreed definition of the term “public law litigation.” “Private 
law litigation” is easier to define. In private law cases, courts are “called upon to 
resolve private disputes between private individuals according to the principles of 
private law.”27 One could define “public law cases” to encompass everything 
other than private law cases, but that definition is overbroad.
28
 Professor Chayes 
says that “public law litigation” includes cases in which courts “are asked to deal 
with grievances over the administration of some public or quasi-public program 
and to vindicate the public policies embodied in the governing statutes or 
constitutional provisions.”29 This definition is excessively narrow. It excludes 
cases in which courts are asked to vindicate the public policies embodied in 
treaties or customary international law. Those cases comprised a substantial 
portion of the Supreme Court’s public law caseload before the Civil War.  
 
Professors Goldsmith and Levinson define “public law” to include 
“constitutional and international law — legal regimes that both constitute and 
govern the behavior of states and state actors.”30 Their analysis provides 
                                                 
27
 Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 
(1983). 
28
 Three categories of cases are neither “private law” nor “public law” cases, as those terms are 
used in this article. See infra note 59. 
29
 Chayes, supra note 27, at 4. 
30
 Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2009).  
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important insights about the similarities between international law and 
constitutional law.
31
 Moreover, their definition is helpful because it focuses on the 
use of law to govern the behavior of state actors. However, their analysis obscures 
the fact that courts also apply statutory and common law to regulate state actors.  
 
This article adopts a functional approach. In private law cases, courts 
adjudicate disputes between private parties. In public law cases, private actors ask 
courts to apply their judicial power to regulate the conduct of government actors. 
Accordingly, this article defines “public law cases” to comprise litigated cases 
involving a dispute between a private party and a government actor in which the 
private party alleges that the government actor committed, or threatened to 
commit, a violation of some established legal norm.
32
 The legal norm might be 
expressed in constitutional law, statutory law, international law, or common law. 
The defining feature of public law litigation is not the source of the norm; it is the 
fact that a private party seeks judicial assistance in regulating the conduct of 
government actors. 
 
B. Judicial Review and Popular Sovereignty 
 
Courts engage in “judicial review,” as defined herein,33 when they assess 
the legality of federal, state, or local government action, including action by 
legislatures, courts, and executive or administrative agencies or officers.
34
 Judicial 
review typically involves some element of judicial lawmaking. Courts are 
required to apply the law. However, the line between “applying law” and “making 
law” is notoriously fuzzy. In most cases, appellate judges “make” law in the very 
process of “applying” law. When judges apply specific, narrowly drawn legal 
rules the leeway for judicial lawmaking is more limited. When they apply broad, 
vaguely worded legal rules the leeway for judicial lawmaking is greater. 
Appellate judges often apply broad, vaguely worded legal rules because that is an 
essential part of their job. Therefore, appellate judges cannot perform the vital 
task of judicial review without engaging in some judicial lawmaking. 
                                                 
31
 See id. 
32
 Aside from the inclusion of international law claims, the difference between Prof. Chayes’ 
definition and mine is largely semantic. By focusing on the effort to “vindicate public policies,” 
Chayes tacitly adopts the government’s perspective. By focusing on violations of legal norms by 
government officers, my definition purposefully adopts the private party’s perspective. 
Regardless, the class of cases covered by the two formulations is similar. 
33
 Judicial review is not the same as public law litigation. Courts sometimes perform judicial 
review in private law cases. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
34
 The term “judicial review” is sometimes defined more narrowly to include only cases where 
courts evaluate the constitutional validity of legislation. That narrow definition would exclude 
most nineteenth century public law litigation, because nineteenth century lawyers challenged 
executive and administrative action much more frequently than they challenged legislative action. 
See infra Part II.E. This article adopts a broad definition to facilitate comparison between 
nineteenth century judicial review and modern judicial review. 
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“Popular sovereignty” means that people are governed by laws of their 
own creation. The people can make law directly, by referendum, or indirectly, by 
electing representatives who make laws on their behalf.
35
 Given the inevitability 
of judicial lawmaking, there is inherent tension between judicial review and 
popular sovereignty, because judge-made law is not made by “the people.”36 
Other things being equal, tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty 
is mitigated when the outcome of judicial lawmaking is subject to modification by 
a popularly elected legislature. In contrast, tension between judicial review and 
popular sovereignty is exacerbated when the product of judicial lawmaking is not 
subject to revision by an elected legislature. 
 
This observation provides a basis for assessing the impact on popular 
sovereignty of different forms of judicial review. If the Supreme Court applies 
federal constitutional law as a rule of decision, the Court does not merely decide 
the case. It also creates or modifies the controlling rule, yielding a constitutional 
rule that is not subject to revision by legislative majorities in Congress or state 
legislatures.
37
 Thus, in a system characterized by judicial supremacy, judicial 
review based on federal constitutional law tends to exacerbate the tension 
between judicial review and popular sovereignty because judge-made 
constitutional law cannot be modified by a popularly elected legislature.
38
 
 
In contrast, if the Supreme Court applies a federal statute to decide a case, 
the Court has final decision-making authority in the case, but Congress retains the 
power to amend the statute. If the Court applies a treaty to decide a case, 
Congress cannot rewrite the treaty, but Congress can enact a later-in-time statute 
that supersedes the treaty for purposes of domestic law.
39
 Similarly, when the 
Court applies customary international law to decide a case, Congress cannot 
rewrite the international legal rule, but some domestic legislature has the power to 
                                                 
35
 Citizens also shape lawmaking in less formal ways, but elections and referenda are the primary 
formal mechanisms for citizens to influence the lawmaking process. 
36
 Various mechanisms empower citizens to exercise popular control over judges. Federal judges 
must be confirmed by the peoples’ representatives in the Senate. Many states have some form of 
judicial elections. Regardless, the average citizen has less power to control judicial lawmaking 
than he or she has to influence legislative lawmaking. 
37
 Some federal constitutional rules are subordinated to the will of Congress. For example, Article 
I, section 10 lists actions that states shall not undertake “without the Consent of Congress.” U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 10. Regardless, the vast majority of federal constitutional rules are not subject to 
revision by legislative majorities. 
38
 Some forms of constitutional judicial review are democracy-enhancing. See, e.g., Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2012). However, constitutional judicial review as practiced by the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts tends to exacerbate the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. See 
generally id. at 27-71. 
39
 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 6, § 115(1)(a). 
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enact legislation to displace the international rule for purposes of domestic law.
40
 
Thus, judicial review based on statutes, treaties, or customary international law 
mitigates the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty because 
popularly elected legislatures retain the power to modify the controlling domestic 
rules if they dislike the outcome of the Court’s judicial lawmaking.41 
 
Scholars who criticize the democracy deficit of international law typically 
focus on the initial lawmaking process, not the power of elected legislatures to 
modify the results of judicial lawmaking. Under this view, one could say that the 
Constitution is “democratic” because the original Constitution was ratified by 
state conventions whose members were popularly elected.
42
 Moreover, much 
international law is “undemocratic” because it is not made by popularly elected 
legislatures.
43
 
  
Although it is reasonable to compare the democratic legitimacy of 
international and constitutional law by reference to the initial lawmaking process, 
the preceding argument is misleading. Virtually all modern federal constitutional 
law is constitutional common law; it is the product of a judicial lawmaking 
process that is largely untethered from the constitutional text.
44
 Constitutional 
common law has never been approved by majority vote in any legislature. 
Therefore, the process for making federal constitutional law is in tension with the 
ideal of popular sovereignty because most federal constitutional law is made by 
unelected judges, not popularly elected legislatures.
45
 
 
Concerns about the democracy deficit of international law focus on the 
process for creating law on the international plane. Broadly speaking, those 
                                                 
40
 If a rule of customary international law falls within the scope of Congress’ legislative authority, 
Congress can enact federal legislation to modify the controlling domestic rule. See id. If the 
international rule is beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative authority, then it presumably falls 
within the scope of state legislative authority, and state legislatures can modify the controlling 
domestic rule. 
41
 The rule that Congress has the power to override customary international law was well settled 
before the Civil War. See David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, and William S. Dodge, 
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, at 32-34, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra 
note 15. The rule that Congress has the power to override treaties did not become firmly 
established until the 1870s or 1880s. See id. at 18-19; Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme 
Court, 1861-1900, at 73-74, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 15. 
42
 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 113-28 (1996) (discussing state ratifying conventions). 
43
 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007). 
44
 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
45
 The tension remains, even assuming that other features of our constitutional system ensure that 
the Court’s constitutional decisions do not stray too far from current majoritarian preferences. 
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concerns are well-founded.
46
 However, in evaluating whether international-law-
based judicial review is consistent with principles of popular sovereignty, the 
more salient question is how a particular rule of international law is incorporated 
into domestic law. If an international norm is incorporated into domestic law by 
majority vote in an elected legislature, application of that norm by domestic 
courts is generally consistent with principles of popular sovereignty. Here, one 
must distinguish between treaties, congressional-executive agreements, sole 
executive agreements, and customary international law. 
 
An Article II treaty becomes law in the United States only after a 
supermajority vote in the Senate and Presidential ratification.
47
 Similarly, 
congressional-executive agreements require a majority vote in both Houses of 
Congress.
48
 Thus, judicial application of Article II treaties and congressional-
executive agreements is broadly consistent with popular sovereignty
49
 because 
those legal norms are incorporated into U.S. law by a majoritarian, democratic 
process.
50
 In contrast, courts sometimes apply sole executive agreements
51
 or 
rules of customary international law
52
 that have not been approved by any 
domestic legislature. Judicial review of government conduct by reference to sole 
executive agreements, or unincorporated customary international law,
53
 creates 
greater tension with popular sovereignty because courts are applying legal norms 
that have not been approved by a popularly elected legislature. 
                                                 
46
 See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 43. 
47
 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
48
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 303, cmts. a, e.  
49
 There are two types of congressional-executive agreements: “ex ante” and “ex post.” Congress 
approves “ex post” agreements after the text has been negotiated. The democratic pedigree of such 
agreements is unimpeachable. The Executive Branch negotiates “ex ante” agreements on the basis 
of prior statutory authorization. The Executive Branch sometimes claims prior authorization based 
on statutory language that is vague, outdated, or both. Accordingly, scholars have challenged the 
democratic pedigree of “ex ante” agreements, noting that the Executive Branch sometimes claims 
statutory authorization for an agreement that is largely the product of lawmaking by unelected 
executive officials. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: 
Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140, 155-67 (2009). 
50
 Many international agreements include broad, vaguely worded provisions that leave ample 
leeway for judicial lawmaking. Such agreements are similar to the Constitution in this respect. 
However, in contrast to the Constitution, judicial lawmaking based on such international 
agreements is subject to revision by elected legislatures. 
51
 Sole executive agreements are binding international agreements concluded by the President 
without congressional approval on the basis of his Article II authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 6, § 303, cmts. g, h. 
52
 See, e.g., Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (applying the customary 
international law doctrine of head-of-state immunity to justify dismissal of a claim against Sri 
Lanka’s head of state). 
53
 Judicial application of customary international law that has been incorporated into a federal 
statute is generally consistent with democratic principles. See infra notes 315-21 and 
accompanying text. 
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In sum, concerns about the democratic legitimacy of international law are 
well-founded, insofar as one focuses on the lawmaking process on the 
international plane. However, judicial application of federal constitutional law 
exacerbates the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty more 
than any other form of judicial review. Most modern constitutional law is the 
product of a lawmaking process controlled by unelected federal judges. Moreover, 
judicial lawmaking based on federal constitutional law — unlike judicial 
lawmaking based on treaties, executive agreements, or customary international 
law — yields outcomes that are not subject to revision by a popularly elected 
legislature. 
 
C. Constitutionalization and Judicial Supremacy 
 
Constitutionalization is the process whereby constitutional law displaced 
other sources of law as the dominant public law discourse in federal courts. As the 
public law litigation system has become increasingly constitutionalized, federal 
courts have increasingly relied on constitutional law as the primary source of law 
to resolve public law controversies.
54
 
 
The term “judicial supremacy” describes a system in which “judges have 
the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and . . . their decisions 
determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone.”55 Constitutionalization 
and judicial supremacy are not necessarily connected. In theory, the U.S. could 
have a system of judicial supremacy without constitutionalization. In that case, 
courts would determine the meaning of the Constitution, but they would apply the 
Constitution only rarely. Alternatively, we could have constitutionalization 
without judicial supremacy. In that case, courts would apply the Constitution to 
resolve most public law controversies presented for judicial decision, but other 
government actors would not be bound by judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution (except that parties would be bound by decisions in cases where they 
are parties). 
 
Professor Kramer has shown that judicial supremacy did not become an 
entrenched feature of the U.S. constitutional system until the period between the 
Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Cooper v. Aaron56 and Edwin Meese’s 1986 
speech advocating a departmental theory of constitutional interpretation.
57
 As 
shown in Figure Three below, this is roughly the same period when constitutional 
law discourse became firmly established as the dominant public law discourse in 
the United States. 
                                                 
54
 See infra Part II.D. 
55
 KRAMER, supra note 1, at 125. 
56
 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
57
 See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 220-21.  
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If the U.S. legal system had developed constitutionalization without 
judicial supremacy, then judicial review would not threaten popular sovereignty 
because popularly elected legislatures could reject the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional rulings. Similarly, if the U.S. had developed judicial supremacy 
without constitutionalization, popular sovereignty would not be threatened 
because most judicial review would be based on statutes, international law, and/or 
common law. In that case, democratically elected legislatures would retain the 
power to modify the governing legal rules. In fact, though, our system of public 
law litigation has evolved in a way that combines constitutionalization with 
judicial supremacy. That combination creates significant tension between judicial 
review and the principle of popular sovereignty. 
 
Advocates of popular constitutionalism seek to resolve that tension by 
rejecting judicial supremacy. Advocates of judicial supremacy contend that the 
popular constitutionalist cure is worse than the disease.
58
 However, even the most 
ardent proponents of judicial supremacy would presumably admit that the ideal of 
popular sovereignty is a core ideal of our democratic system, and that our current, 
constitutionalized system of public law litigation creates significant tension 
between judicial review and popular sovereignty.  
 
The preceding analysis offers a potential solution to this dilemma. If we 
could partially reverse the process of constitutionalization, and revive the 
nineteenth century model of polymorphous public law litigation, then we could 
preserve the benefits of judicial review and mitigate the tension between judicial 
supremacy and popular sovereignty. I return to this idea in Part Four below. Parts 
Two and Three demonstrate that federal courts actually applied a polymorphous 
model of public law litigation throughout the nineteenth century. 
 
II 
An Empirical Analysis of Constitutionalization 
 
Part Two presents an empirical analysis of constitutionalization. The first 
section provides an overview of the databases used for the analysis. The second 
section discusses methodology and research design. The third section documents 
the Supreme Court’s transition from a private law to a public law focus. The next 
section shows that, within the class of public law cases, constitutional law 
displaced other sources of law as the dominant public law discourse in the 
Supreme Court. The final section offers some tentative, possible explanations for 
the process of constitutionalization. 
 
 
                                                 
58
 See, e.g., Alexander and Solum, supra note 2; Chemerinsky, supra note 24. 
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A. Creating the Database 
 
Creation of the database proceeded in two phases. In phase one, I 
segregated public law cases from other cases so that phase two analysis could 
focus exclusively on public law cases. Phase one applied a simple, quick, 
objective method to review approximately 27,000 Supreme Court cases and 
identify the public law cases within the larger universe. 
 
In phase one, classification was based strictly on the identity of the parties. 
If all parties to the litigation are private actors, the case is classified as PP (private 
law). If a private actor is adverse to a government actor, the case is classified as 
PG (public law).
59
 The PG classification provided an excellent proxy for 
identifying true “public law cases,” as defined above. Phase two analysis 
confirmed that approximately ninety-eight percent of the cases correctly classified 
as PG in phase one are “public law cases,” as defined herein.60 
 
I divided Supreme Court history from 1801 to 2005 into eight periods. 
Period 1 is the Marshall Court (1801-35) and Period 2 is the Taney Court (1836-
64). The transition between Periods 2 and 3 corresponds with the end of the Civil 
War and the appointment of Chief Justice Salmon Chase. Period 3 (1865-88) goes 
from the Civil War to the industrial revolution; it ends in 1888 when Melville 
Fuller replaced Morrison Waite as Chief Justice. Period 4 (1888-1910) covers 
                                                 
59
 The phase one database includes three types of cases that are neither PP nor PG. If one of the 
parties is a foreign state, the case is classified as FS. FS cases are not “public law” because they do 
not involve a dispute between a private party and a domestic government actor. Suits between 
domestic government actors, such as a suit between the United States and one of its constituent 
states, are classified as GG. GG cases do not qualify as “public law” because they do not involve a 
dispute between a private party and a government actor. Mixed party cases, in which a 
government actor and a private party are co-parties, are classified as MP.  
Classification of MP cases is problematic. Some MP cases are similar to PG cases because the 
underlying dispute is between a private party and a government actor. However, most MP cases 
involve an underlying dispute between two private parties that was litigated before an 
administrative tribunal. When the tribunal’s decision is appealed to a court, or the administrative 
agency sues to enforce the tribunal’s decision, the agency becomes a co-party with one of the 
parties to the underlying dispute. Such cases are like PP cases because the underlying dispute is 
between private parties. Since phase one was designed to provide a quick, simple method for 
distinguishing between public and private law cases, I chose to exclude all MP cases from the 
class of public law cases. 
60
 In phase two, I selected at random 1400 PG cases for detailed analysis. I eliminated 137 of those 
cases because the initial classification was incorrect. (They should have been classified as MP or 
PP. See Appendix, Table One.) I eliminated 24 other cases because there was insufficient 
information to perform the detailed phase two analysis. That left 1239 cases for phase two 
analysis. In 27 of those 1239 cases, there was no allegation of unlawful government conduct. The 
other 1212 cases satisfy the above definition of “public law cases” because the private party 
alleged that the government actor violated some established legal norm. 
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Melville Fuller’s tenure as Chief Justice; it includes the beginning of the Lochner 
era. 
 
Period 5 (1910-36) covers the remainder of the Lochner era; it ends with 
the final term before West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
61
 which overruled Lochner v. 
New York.
62
 Period 6 (1936-54) begins with West Coast Hotel and ends with the 
last term before Brown v. Board of Education.
63
 Brown coincides with the 
beginning of the Warren Court. Period 7 (1954-72) covers the Warren Court and 
ends with the last term before Roe v. Wade.
64
 The transition from Period 7 to 8 is 
marked by the appointments of Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969) and Associate 
Justices Rehnquist and Powell (1972), which created a conservative majority for 
the first time since 1937. Period 8 (1973-2005) begins with Roe and ends with the 
final term of the Rehnquist Court. The lines dividing periods are necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary. However, there is no reason to believe that selection of 
different dividing lines would yield substantially different results.  
 
Whereas phase one involved “quick and dirty” analysis of about 27,000 
Supreme Court decisions,
65
 phase two entailed more detailed analysis of 1400 PG 
cases from periods 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8. I excluded periods 4 and 5 from the phase 
two database because this project examines the contrast between nineteenth 
century public law litigation and modern public law litigation. A follow-on 
project will examine in greater detail the transition in periods 4 and 5. 
 
For phase two, I selected a random sample of PG cases from each of the 
periods identified above.
66
 Research assistants and I analyzed the Supreme Court 
decisions, the lower court decisions (when available), and the parties’ arguments. 
We recorded information about the type of law invoked by lawyers, lower court 
judges, and Supreme Court Justices – including common law, state law, federal 
statutes, treaties, customary international law, and federal constitutional law.
67
 We 
                                                 
61
 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
62
 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
63
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
64
 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
65
 In phase one, student research assistants reviewed every Supreme Court decision from John 
Marshall’s first term as Chief Justice until William Rehnquist’s last term. Students classified every 
case as PP, PG, FS, GG, or MP. See supra note 59. To facilitate timely completion, I instructed 
students to spend no more than five minutes per case, and to resolve doubts in favor of a PG 
classification. The latter instruction yielded an over-estimate of the number of PG cases in phase 
one; that was a deliberate attempt to ensure that no PG cases were excluded from the universe 
from which I drew a random sample in phase two. Subsequently, I did an error analysis to 
compensate for the initial over-estimate. See Appendix, Table One.  
66
 Phase two analysis is based on a random sample of 360 PG cases from period 8, 240 PG cases 
from period 7, and 200 PG cases each from periods 1, 2, 3, and 6. 
67
 For periods 6 to 8, two students reviewed every sample case and entered information into an 
Excel file in accordance with my detailed instructions. Students compared their entries to each 
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documented the frequency with which lawyers and judges invoked and applied 
different types of law in different time periods. We also recorded a large volume 
of other information for every case in the phase two database.
68
 The phase two 
database enables one to derive a quantitative measurement of the extent to which 
constitutional law has displaced other sources of law as the dominant discourse in 
public law cases. 
 
B. Methodology and Research Design 
 
Part Two employs quantitative analysis, but presents the data in a way that 
is accessible to readers with no training in statistical methods. To make the 
analysis accessible, I present the data in graphic form, with very few numbers. 
The Appendix contains detailed tables supporting the information presented 
graphically in Part Two. The text and footnotes in Part Two identifies the findings 
that are statistically significant. Given the basic choice of a “soft empiricist” 
methodology, there are two potential objections to project design that merit a 
response: 1) the definition of “public law” excludes many cases that should be 
included; and 2) the focus on Supreme Court cases excludes a large body of 
public law litigation in state courts. I address these issues below. 
 
1. The Definition of Public Law (Revisited): Courts often perform judicial 
review in private law cases. For example, in a dispute between private parties, 
where one party invokes a state statute to support its position, the opposing party 
may argue that the statute is unconstitutional, or that it is preempted by federal 
law.
69
 If the court rules on the validity of state law, it is engaging in judicial 
review. However, such cases are excluded from phase two analysis because they 
were classified as “PP” in phase one: a dispute between private parties. Thus, 
exclusion of PP cases from phase two excludes some cases involving judicial 
review. 
 
Nevertheless, exclusion of PP cases from phase two analysis is justified. 
First, inclusion of PP cases in the universe from which a random sample was 
selected would have created serious problems. The Supreme Court’s nineteenth 
century docket included more PP than PG cases, whereas the Court’s twentieth 
                                                                                                                                     
other’s and referred disagreements to me. I reviewed the Excel files for consistency and accuracy. 
For periods 1 to 3, I reviewed the cases myself and entered data into Excel files. The nineteenth 
century jurisprudence is sufficiently unfamiliar to most law students that I could not rely on 
student research assistants to enter accurate information about nineteenth century cases.  
68
 The data for phases one and two is recorded in Excel files that are available upon request. The 
instructions provided to research assistants are also available upon request. 
69
 See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (in suit between private parties, 
Court held that ERISA preempted Texas Health Care Liability Act); Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (in suit between private parties, Court held that New Jersey statute 
violated First Amendment). 
Polymorphous Public Law Litigation 
David Sloss, Draft, January 2014 
 
18 
 
century docket included more PG than PP cases.
70
 The project was designed to 
compare nineteenth century public law litigation to modern public law litigation. 
If the random sample drew from a universe comprising all PP and PG cases, the 
sample would have been weighted more toward PP cases in the nineteenth 
century, and more toward PG cases in the twentieth century. Given the generic 
differences between private law and public law litigation,
71
 this would have 
produced an “apples to oranges” comparison, instead of an “apples to apples” 
comparison. 
  
Moreover, the project was designed to test the hypothesis that the 
nineteenth century Supreme Court applied international law more frequently than 
it applied constitutional law. During the nineteenth century, the Court often 
applied international law to help resolve disputes between private parties.
72
 
Hence, if one drew a sample from a universe comprising all PP and PG cases, the 
PP cases would likely skew the results for the nineteenth century in favor of 
international law, because the nineteenth century Supreme Court probably applied 
international law more frequently than it applied constitutional law to resolve 
disputes between private parties.
73
 Therefore, PP cases are excluded from phase 
two to avoid skewing the results. 
 
2. Public Law Litigation in State Courts: The author constructed the 
project database by reviewing U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Phase two analysis 
included review of state court and lower federal court decisions that were 
appealed to the Supreme Court. However, state court decisions that never reached 
the Supreme Court are excluded from both phase one and phase two databases. 
Exclusion of such decisions is potentially significant because state courts handle 
lots of public law litigation. In the nineteenth century, there was a rich tradition of 
public law litigation in state courts.
74
 It is questionable whether international law 
was ever the dominant public law discourse in state courts, even in the nineteenth 
century.
75
 Thus, the empirical evidence supports the claim that international law 
                                                 
70
 See infra Figure One, and Appendix, Table One. 
71
 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
72
 See generally CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 15. The book documents the Supreme 
Court’s application of international law from the Founding to the present. 
73
 I thank Professor Paul Stephan for identifying this issue during early discussions about project 
design. 
74
 See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 123-43 (2012).  
75
 Figure Seven below shows that international law was never the dominant discourse in public 
law cases involving claims against state and local government actors. Most public law claims 
against federal government actors have traditionally been litigated in federal court, not state court. 
Since international law never featured prominently in public law claims against state and local 
government actors, one could reasonably infer that the international law discourse that prevailed in 
federal courts in the pre-Civil War era was not as prevalent in state courts during that period.  
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was the dominant public law discourse in federal courts before the Civil War,
76
 
but it does not support any empirical claim about public law litigation in state 
courts in the nineteenth century. 
 
Hence, one could argue that exclusion of state court cases presents a 
distorted picture of nineteenth century public law litigation. Nevertheless, that 
exclusion is justified. First, the project focuses on the constitutionalization of 
American public law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on federal 
constitutional law to resolve public law controversies is problematic because 
application of federal constitutional law exacerbates the tension between judicial 
review and popular sovereignty. In contrast, application of state constitutional law 
by state supreme courts is more consistent with principles of popular 
sovereignty.
77
 Therefore, application of state law by state courts is tangential to 
the concerns about the anti-democratic effects of constitutionalization that 
motivate this project. 
 
Second, an attempt to collect systematic, quantitative data about public 
law litigation in fifty state supreme courts over two hundred years would face 
tremendous practical obstacles. Many state supreme court decisions are 
unpublished, especially in older cases. Quantitative analysis cannot readily 
account for unpublished decisions. Exclusion of unpublished decisions would 
introduce bias into the results, and it would be difficult to assess the magnitude or 
directionality of that bias. Apart from concerns about biased data, the volume of 
potentially relevant decisions is enormous. Hence, expansion of the project to 
encompass state supreme court decisions would not have been feasible in a 
reasonable time frame. 
 
                                                 
76
 One might object that the empirical evidence merely supports claims about the Supreme Court, 
not lower federal courts. However, unlike the modern Court, the nineteenth century Supreme 
Court had very little control over the types of cases it received from the lower federal courts. See 
Carolyn Shapiro, A “Progressive Contraction of Jurisdiction”: The Making of the Modern 
Supreme Court 80, 81 in THEN & NOW: STORIES OF LAW AND PROGRESS (2013). Therefore, a 
random sample of sufficient numbers of Supreme Court decisions should provide a fairly accurate 
picture of the types of claims raised in lower federal courts in the nineteenth century. 
77
 Compared to federal constitutional law, state constitutional law is relatively easy to alter by 
populist means. America’s “fifty states have held 233 constitutional conventions [and] adopted 
146 constitutions” since 1776. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION 1 (2009). In contrast, the federal government has not convened a constitutional 
convention since 1787. Moreover, it is much easier to amend state constitutions than the U.S. 
Constitution. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248-49 
(Sanford Levinson, ed.) (1995). Whereas democratic majorities can overrule state court 
constitutional decisions by amending the state’s constitution, it is practically impossible for 
democratic majorities to overrule a federal constitutional decision by amending the U.S. 
Constitution. 
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C. The Transition from Private Law to Public Law 
 
Figure One summarizes the main results of phase one data analysis.
78
 
Between 1801 and 1888, more than 60% of the Supreme Court’s cases were 
private law cases. Since 1936, though, public law cases have occupied more than 
65% of the Supreme Court docket. The shift from a private law to public law is 
significant because it multiplies the effect of constitutionalization. The 
quantitative analysis summarized in Figures Three to Seven below measures 
judicial reliance on constitutional law as a percentage of public law cases. Figure 
One shows that the percentage of public law cases on the Supreme Court docket 
has increased over time. Hence, if one measured judicial reliance on constitutional 
law as a percentage of the Court’s total caseload, instead of measuring it as a 
percentage of public law cases, the degree of constitutionalization would be even 
greater.
79
 
 
In addition to recording the split between private and public law, phase 
one data also shows the division, within the class of PG cases, between cases 
involving federal government actors and those involving state and local 
government actors. Figure Two shows that the proportion of federal cases on the 
Supreme Court docket has declined, while the proportion of state/local cases has 
increased.
80
 In the pre-Civil War era, most public law cases involved federal 
government actors. From the 1860s to the 1970s (periods 3 to 7), the ratio of 
federal cases to state/local cases was fairly even and fairly constant, except during 
period 6, when federal cases predominated. Period 8, from 1972 to 2005, is the 
only period when the Supreme Court decided more state/local cases than federal 
cases.
81
 
                                                 
78
 Figure One summarizes the results of phase one analysis, but the numbers are adjusted to 
correct for errors in phase one data. See Appendix, Table One, for an explanation of the error 
analysis. All point estimates in Figure One represent the mid-points of the estimated range of 
values. The “public law” category includes all cases classified as PG, including cases that were 
eventually excluded from phase two because they did not satisfy the definition of “public law 
cases.” See supra notes 60 and 65. The “other” category includes cases classified as FS, GG, and 
MP. See supra note 59. 
79
 This statement assumes that the Court is more likely to apply constitutional law in public law 
cases than in private law cases. I have not tested that assumption empirically, but I am fairly 
confident it is correct. 
80
 “Federal” cases are those in which a federal government actor is a party, regardless of whether 
the case originated in federal court. “State/local” cases are those in which a state or local 
government actor is a party, regardless of whether the case originated in state court. 
81
 In phase one, all PG cases were further categorized based on the identity of the government 
party. The five sub-categories are federal, state, local, territorial (for cases involving a territorial 
government), or mixed (where federal and state government actors were co-parties). If state and 
local government actors are co-parties, the case is coded as “state.” The “other” category in Figure 
Two includes territorial cases and mixed cases. Unlike Figure One, the data in Figure Two does 
not incorporate an error analysis because the phase two analysis did not uncover any systematic 
error in the phase one categorization of cases as “federal,” “state,” or “local.”  
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Figure One 
The Percentage of Public Law and  
Private Law Cases on the Supreme Court Docket 
 
 
 
 
The increasing percentage of state/local cases on the Supreme Court 
docket is significant because the Court has always relied more heavily on 
constitutional law in state/local cases than in federal cases.
82
 Thus, the rising 
percentage of state/local cases on the Court’s docket provides a partial 
explanation for constitutionalization. However, as illustrated in Figures Six and 
Seven below, there is evidence of constitutionalization within the class of federal 
cases, and separately within the class of state/local cases. Therefore, the 
increasing percentage of state/local cases, and the corresponding decline in the 
percentage of federal cases, does not provide a complete explanation of 
constitutionalization.   
  
                                                 
82
 See Figures Six and Seven below. See also Appendix, Table Three. 
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Figure Two 
Percentage of Public Law Cases on the Supreme Court Docket 
Involving Federal vs. State & Local Government Actors 
 
 
 
D. The Constitutionalization of American Public Law 
 
Figure Three illustrates the constitutionalization of American public law.
83
 
It shows that constitutional law has displaced other sources of law as the 
dominant public law discourse in federal courts. Figure Three also shows that, in 
the pre-Civil War era, international law claims prevailed over constitutional 
claims, and international law was the main source of non-statutory law that the 
Court applied to decide public law cases. 
                                                 
83
 The data in Figure Three is based on the phase two database. The percentages are estimates of 
the percentage of public law cases in which the Supreme Court applied international law and 
constitutional law, respectively, to help resolve claims alleging unlawful government conduct. The 
denominator for all percentages is the number of cases in the phase two database for a given 
period that the Court decided on the merits. The numerator is the number of those cases in which 
the Court applied international law, or constitutional law, or neither international nor 
constitutional law. See Appendix, Table Two. 
The phase two database contains detailed information about the extent to which the Court 
relied on common law and state law, as well as international law and federal constitutional law. 
Since courts and litigants invoke federal statutes in almost all public law cases, the database does 
not record reliance on federal statutes, except to show cases where courts and litigants did not 
invoke any source of law other than federal statutes. The database does not distinguish between 
statutes and regulations for this purpose. 
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The quantitative difference between judicial application of international 
law and constitutional law is statistically significant for every period shown in 
Figure Three, except period 3. The difference between judicial application of 
constitutional law and “neither international nor constitutional law” is statistically 
significant for every period except period 6. The difference between international 
law and the “neither” category is not statistically significant in periods 1 and 2, 
but is statistically significant in later periods.
84
 
 
Figure Three 
Percentage of Supreme Court Decisions in Public Law Cases  
In Which the Court Applied Constitutional versus International Law 
 
 
 
Figure Three illustrates the decline of polymorphous judicial review and 
the corresponding rise of constitutionalization since World War II. The chart 
shows that the Court applied a polymorphous model from the Founding until 
about the 1950s. Even in period 6, after judicial reliance on international law had 
waned, the Court decided approximately 45-60 percent of its public law cases by 
applying sources other than constitutional law.
85
 However, during and after the 
Warren Court, constitutional law eclipsed every other source of law as the 
dominant public law discourse in the Supreme Court. 
                                                 
84
 Throughout this paper, the statement that a measurement is statistically significant means that it 
is significant at a 95% confidence level. See Appendix, Table Two, for estimates of confidence 
intervals associated with the data depicted in Figures Three, Four and Five. 
85
 See Appendix, Table Two. 
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Figures Four and Five show that the type of law applied by courts is 
consistent with the type of law invoked by private parties. Courts typically apply 
international law to decide cases where private parties allege international law 
violations by government actors. Similarly, courts typically apply constitutional 
law to decide cases where private parties allege constitutional law violations by 
government actors. Thus, perhaps lawyers, not judges, have driven the trend 
toward greater constitutionalization of public law. On the other hand, lawyers 
typically invoke arguments that they think have the best chance of winning. 
Therefore, lawyers’ tendency to rely more on constitutional law in later historical 
periods probably reflects their judgment about the receptivity of courts to 
different types of legal arguments.
86
 
 
Figure Four – The Decline of International Law 
 
 
 
In Figure Four, there is no statistically significant difference among the 
three discrete measurements within a particular time period. Whether one uses 
Supreme Court decisions, lower court decisions, or private party claims as a 
metric to measure reliance on international law, the results are statistically 
                                                 
86
 For Figures Four and Five, the percentage of cases where the private party raised an 
international law claim, or a constitutional law claim, is calculated as a percentage of the total 
cases in the database for that period. In contrast, the percentages for judicial decisions are 
calculated as a percentage of decisions on the merits in a given time period. The “court below” in 
Figures Four and Five is the last court to address the case before it reached the Supreme Court. See 
Appendix, Table Two. 
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indistinguishable within a particular time period. Similarly, in Figure Five, there 
is no statistically significant difference among the three discrete measurements of 
reliance on constitutional law within a particular time period. 
 
Looking at changes over time for international law (Figure Four), there 
was no statistically significant difference between periods 1 and 2, or between 
periods 6, 7, and 8. However, there was a statistically significant decline in 
reliance on international law between periods 2 and 3, and again between periods 
3 and 6.
87
 With respect to Figure Five, there was a statistically significant increase 
in reliance on constitutional law from period 1 to 3, from period 3 to 6, and from 
period 6 to 8.
88
 However, the differences between adjacent periods in Figure Five 
are not statistically significant. 
 
Figure Five – The Rise of Constitutional Law 
  
 
 
Figures Three and Five demonstrate that constitutional law has displaced 
other sources of law as the dominant public law discourse in the Supreme Court. 
Or, to state the point differently, the constitutionalized model of public law 
                                                 
87
 See Appendix, Table Two. 
88
 For the transition from period 1 to 3, the rise in private party claims based on constitutional law 
is not (quite) statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. However, the other two 
measures are statistically significant at the 95% level. For the transitions from period 3 to 6, and 
from period 6 to 8, all three measures are statistically significant. See Appendix, Table Two.  
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litigation has supplanted the polymorphous model of public law litigation that 
prevailed in the nineteenth century. 
 
If one divides public law cases between federal cases and state/local cases, 
a somewhat different picture emerges. Figures Six and Seven, respectively, 
present data about public law cases involving alleged violations by federal 
government actors,
89
 and by state and local government actors.
90
 
 
Figure Six 
Alleged Violations by Federal Government Actors 
 
 
 
A comparison between Figures Six and Seven is illuminating. First, note 
that federal courts have always relied more heavily on constitutional law in 
                                                 
89
 In Figure Six, the denominator for all percentages is the number of federal cases in the phase 
two database for a given period that the Court decided on the merits. The numerator is the number 
of those cases in which the Court applied international law, or constitutional law, or neither 
international nor constitutional law. See Appendix, Table Three. 
90
 In Figure Seven, the percentages are calculated in the same way as in Figure Six, except that the 
numerators and denominators include state/local cases, instead of federal cases. See Appendix, 
Table Four. In period 1, there were very few public law cases involving claims against state and 
local government actors. See Figure Two supra. In Figures Seven and Eight, where state/local 
cases are segregated from federal cases, I do not include data for period 1 for state/local cases 
because there are too few cases to support any significant findings.  
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state/local cases than in federal cases.
91
 For state/local cases, reliance on 
constitutional law ranged from a low of about forty-three percent in periods 2 and 
3, to a high of about ninety percent in periods 6 and 7. In contrast, for federal 
cases, reliance on constitutional law ranged from a low of less than ten percent in 
periods 1 to 3, to a high of about fifty percent in period 8. 
 
Figure Seven 
Alleged Violations by State & Local Government Actors 
 
 
 
Second, note that constitutionalization occurred earlier for state and local 
cases than it did for federal cases. As shown in Figure Seven, litigation of 
state/local cases became heavily constitutionalized somewhere between periods 3 
and 6. However, as shown in Figure Six, litigation of federal cases did not really 
become constitutionalized until period 8.
92
 
 
Third, note the difference between federal cases and state/local cases in 
the nineteenth century regarding application of international law. International 
law claims accounted for about 44% of federal cases in period 1, 56% of federal 
cases in period 2, and 22% of federal cases in period 3.
93
 In contrast, international 
                                                 
91
 This proposition is also true if one uses private party claims, rather than judicial decisions, as a 
metric for measuring reliance on constitutional law. See Appendix, Tables Three and Four. 
92
 Data for periods 4 and 5 is absent, but it is unlikely that the percentage of federal cases in which 
the Court applied constitutional law was higher in period 4 or 5 than it was in periods 6 and 7.  
93
 See Appendix, Table Three. 
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claims never accounted for more than 10% of the state/local cases in any period.
94
 
For the federal cases depicted in Figure Six, there was a statistically significant 
decline in reliance on international law between periods 2 and 3, and again 
between periods 3 and 6.
95
 For the state/local cases displayed in Figure Seven, 
there was no statistically significant change in reliance on international law across 
time periods. The Supreme Court has never relied heavily on international law to 
decide state/local cases. 
 
Focusing on Figure Six, it bears emphasis that the polymorphous model 
prevailed for federal cases from the Founding until the 1970s.
96
 Before the Civil 
War, most claims against federal officers involved international law, common law 
and statutes. (The “neither” category includes both common law and statutory 
claims.) In period 3, immediately after the Civil War, statutory and common law 
claims supplanted international law claims to some extent. Even so, litigants who 
raised claims against federal government actors in period 3 were more likely to 
frame those claims in terms of international law, not constitutional law.
97
 There 
was a statistically significant increase in the percentage of constitutional law 
claims between periods 3 and 6. However, in both periods 6 and 7, the Supreme 
Court was much more likely to decide claims against federal government actors 
by applying statutes, rather than constitutional law.
98
 
 
E. The Decline of the Polymorphous Model of Public Law Litigation 
 
The last section analyzed the type of law courts apply in public law cases, 
emphasizing the distinction between international and constitutional law. To 
assess the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty, it is also 
important to consider the nature of the government conduct being challenged. 
Compare claims challenging legislative action to those challenging executive or 
administrative action. Judicial decisions invalidating statutes exacerbate the 
tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty because the court applies 
its judicial power to invalidate a law adopted by majority vote in a popularly 
                                                 
94
 See Appendix, Table Four. 
95
 See Appendix, Table Three. 
96
 Here, I use the term “polymorphous” to refer to the fact that, for federal cases, non-
constitutional claims prevailed over constitutional claims until the 1970s. 
97
 For federal cases in period 3, using private party claims as a metric, there was a statistically 
significant difference between the incidence of international law and constitutional law claims. See 
Appendix, Table Three. However, using Supreme Court decisions as a metric, the difference 
between international law cases and constitutional law cases was not (quite) statistically 
significant at the 95 percent level. 
98
 Common law claims largely disappeared near the beginning of period 6, due to the Supreme 
Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The incidence of 
international law claims declined significantly between periods 3 and 6. See Appendix, Table 
Three. Hence, in periods 6 to 8, most federal cases involved either statutes or constitutional law. 
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elected legislature.
99
 In contrast, a judicial decision holding that an unelected 
government officer violated a statute is broadly consistent with principles of 
popular sovereignty: the court applies its judicial power to ensure that the 
government officer complies with a law created by a democratic process.
100
 
Several permutations are possible, depending on the type of government conduct 
being challenged, the source of the legal norm applied, and other factors. The 
central point is that claims challenging the validity of legislation tend to 
exacerbate the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. In 
contrast, claims challenging the legality of executive or administrative action 
typically raise fewer concerns about conflicts between judicial review and popular 
sovereignty. 
 
Figure Eight depicts changes over time in the percentage of public law 
cases challenging legislative action. The data in Figure Eight is based on claims 
and defenses raised by private parties, not judicial decisions by courts. Specific 
points are estimates of the percentage of cases in a given period where private 
parties raised claims or defenses challenging the validity of legislation. Focus, 
first, on the middle line, which is an aggregate figure for all public law cases. 
There was a statistically significant increase in cases challenging legislation 
between periods 3 and 6. However, there was no statistically significant change in 
the rate at which private parties challenged legislation across periods 1-3, or 
across periods 6-8.
101
 
 
The top and bottom lines in Figure Eight divide public law cases between 
federal cases and state/local cases. The pattern for federal cases is similar to the 
pattern for total cases. There was a statistically significant increase in cases 
challenging federal legislation between periods 3 and 6. However, there was no 
statistically significant change in the rate at which private parties challenged 
federal legislation across periods 1-3, or across periods 6-8. Before 1888, private 
parties rarely raised claims or defenses challenging the validity of federal 
legislation. In the nineteenth century, most public law litigation with federal 
government actors involved challenges to federal executive or administrative 
action.
102
 
 
 
                                                 
99
 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act is unconstitutional). 
100
 See, e.g., PPL Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 133 S.Ct. 1897 (2013) (in suit against 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, holding that corporate taxpayer had statutory entitlement to 
tax credit). 
101
 See Appendix, Table Five. The increase from period 1 to period 3 is not quite statistically 
significant at the 95% level. 
102
 In periods 1-3, fewer than five percent of federal cases involved challenges to legislative action. 
See Appendix, Table Five. 
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Figure Eight 
Public Law Cases Challenging the Validity of Legislation 
 
 
 
The top line in Figure Eight depicts the percentage of state/local cases 
where private parties challenged the validity of state or local legislation.
103
 The 
contrast with federal cases is striking. Even in the nineteenth century, cases 
challenging state or local legislation were quite common. Indeed, there was no 
statistically significant change in the percentage of state/local cases challenging 
legislation across periods 2, 3, 7, and 8. In period 6, there was a statistically 
significant increase in cases challenging state and local legislation.
104
 The sharp, 
temporary rise in period 6 may have been a remnant from the Lochner era. The 
Supreme Court may have purposefully granted certiorari in numerous cases to 
reject Lochner-type claims challenging state or local legislation.
105
 
 
The data summarized in Figure Nine combines information about the type 
of government conduct challenged (shown in Figure Eight) with information 
                                                 
103
 As noted above, the separate data on state/local cases does not include data for period 1. See 
supra note 91. 
104
 The total number of state/local cases in the phase two database for periods 2, 3, 6, and 7 is 
fairly small. Nevertheless, the spike in cases challenging state and local legislation in period 6 is 
statistically significant. See Appendix, Table Five. 
105
 At least one other fact supports this hypothesis. The phase two database shows that private 
parties had a lower winning percentage in the Supreme Court in period 6 than at any other time in 
Supreme Court history. 
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about the type of legal claim raised (shown in Figures Four and Five). A claim is 
classified as countermajoritarian if the private party both raised a constitutional 
claim and challenged the validity of legislation. A claim is classified as 
majoritarian if the private party neither raised a constitutional claim nor 
challenged the validity of legislation. Like Figure Eight, Figure Nine presents 
information about claims raised by private parties, not judicial decisions by 
courts.
106
 
 
Figure Nine 
The Decline of the Majoritarian Model 
 
 
  
Figure Nine shows that there has been a sharp, steady decline in the 
percentage of public law cases involving majoritarian claims. To reiterate, a case 
is classified as majoritarian if the private party neither challenges legislation nor 
raises a constitutional law argument. The combination of lawyers’ increasing 
reliance on constitutional law to frame arguments in public law cases,
107
 and their 
growing tendency to challenge the validity of legislation,
108
 explains the steady 
decline in majoritarian claims. The percentage of public law cases involving 
majoritarian claims dropped from a high of almost ninety percent in period 1, to a 
                                                 
106
 In Figure Nine, the denominator for each percentage is the total number of cases in the phase 
two database for that period. The numerator is the number of cases in each period satisfying the 
above definitions of “majoritarian” and “countermajoritarian” claims, respectively.  
107
 See Figure Five supra. 
108
 See Figure Eight supra. 
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low of less than twenty-five percent in period 8. This steady decline includes a 
statistically significant drop from period 3 to 6, followed by another statistically 
significant drop from period 6 to 8.
109
 
 
In sum, nineteenth century public law litigation generally conformed to a 
polymorphous model that minimized the tension between judicial review and 
popular sovereignty. Nineteenth century lawyers who challenged the legality of 
government conduct usually challenge executive or administrative action, not 
legislative action. Moreover, they usually raised claims based on statutes, 
international law, or common law, not constitutional law. In contrast, modern 
litigants are more likely to challenge legislative action than their nineteenth 
century predecessors, and they are more likely to raise constitutional claims. 
Greater reliance on constitutional law, combined with the increasing tendency to 
challenge legislative action, means that the modern, constitutionalized system of 
public law litigation exacerbates the tension between judicial review and popular 
sovereignty. 
 
F. Tentative Explanations for Constitutionalization 
Additional empirical analysis of periods 4 and 5 is needed to provide a 
detailed explanation of constitutionalization. That is the subject of a follow-on 
project. Still, it is possible to venture some tentative hypotheses. 
 
First, the differences between federal cases and state/local cases suggest 
that distinct explanations are required for the two sets of cases. For state/local 
cases, the sharp rise in reliance on constitutional law between periods 3 and 6 may 
be related to the development of Lochner jurisprudence in periods 4 and 5.
110
 
Interestingly, though, the repudiation of Lochner at the beginning of period 6 did 
not reverse the process of constitutionalization for state/local cases to any 
significant degree.
111
 During the Lochner era, lawyers and judges became 
accustomed to invoking and applying constitutional law to resolve public law 
claims against state and local government actors. The habit apparently persisted 
after the Court repudiated Lochner. 
 
                                                 
109
 See Appendix, Table Five. The Appendix also provides data that divides the information 
presented in Figures Eight and Nine between federal cases and state/local cases. 
110
 For an excellent historical analysis of Lochner era jurisprudence, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS 
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 11-91 (2000). 
111
 Data about the degree of constitutionalization in the Lochner era is not currently available. 
However, in period 6, after the Court repudiated Lochner, private parties  raised constitutional 
claims in 92% of the state/local cases, and the Supreme Court applied constitutional law in 89% of 
the state/local cases. See Appendix, Table Four. The corresponding percentages could not have 
been much higher, if at all, during the Lochner era. 
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For federal cases, Figure Six shows a significant decline in reliance on 
international law before there was a significant rise in reliance on constitutional 
law. Hence, the decline of international law and the rise of constitutional law 
require separate explanations.
112
 Professor Ramsey has shown that claims 
involving customary international law disappeared from the Supreme Court 
docket in the early twentieth century.
113
 He contends that treaties and statutes 
supplanted customary international law in some fields, while constitutional law 
displaced customary international law in other areas. Additionally, “[m]any 
staples of international law adjudication in the nineteenth century – pirates, prizes, 
and privateers – faded or disappeared altogether.”114 
 
In contrast to customary international law, the Supreme Court continued to 
handle numerous treaty cases in the early twentieth century.
115
 However, a 1925 
amendment to the Judicial Code altered the rules for Supreme Court jurisdiction 
over treaty cases.
116
 Before 1925, jurisdictional statutes gave litigants an 
automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court in most treaty cases. The 1925 
amendment granted the Supreme Court broad discretion to refuse to entertain 
most of those cases.
117
 The Court apparently used its newly granted discretion to 
reduce the number of treaty cases on its docket. 
 
Turning to the Court’s increasing reliance on constitutional law in federal 
cases, Figure Six depicts two distinct spikes. The first spike occurred between 
periods 3 and 6, when the Court’s reliance on constitutional law jumped from 
below ten percent to almost thirty percent.
118
 This spike may also be related to 
changes in jurisdictional statutes between 1888 and 1925 that granted the 
Supreme Court greater control over its docket.
119
  
 
The second spike occurred between periods 7 and 8, when the Court’s 
reliance on constitutional law in federal cases increased from about 31% in period 
7 to almost 50% in period 8. One could hypothesize that the change between 
                                                 
112
 Figure Six shows a decline in international law for federal cases between periods 2 and 3. The 
Court’s overall caseload increased from about 55 cases per year in period 2 to about 189 cases per 
year in period 3. In part, the growing caseload involved new issues for which international law did 
not provide answers. Thus, the declining percentage of international law cases may be partially 
attributable to the growth of the Court’s caseload during this period. 
113
 See Ramsey, supra note 15, at 234-38. 
114
 Id. at 225. 
115
 See Michael Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE, supra note 15, at 191-224. 
116
 An Act to Amend the Judicial Code, 43 Stat. 936. 
117
 See Van Alstine, supra note 115, at 224; Shapiro, supra note 76, at 82-84. 
118
 See Appendix, Table Three. If one measures private party claims, rather than Supreme Court 
decisions, reliance on constitutional law increased from 6% to 34% between periods 3 and 6. See 
id. 
119
 See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 81-85. 
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periods 7 and 8 was related to the Court’s increasing focus on cases challenging 
federal legislation (as opposed to executive or administrative action). However, 
the data in the following table refutes this hypothesis.
120
 Between period 6 and 
period 8, the percentage of federal cases in which private parties challenged 
legislation remained fairly constant.
121
 In contrast, the percentage of federal cases 
in which private parties raised constitutional claims increased significantly 
between periods 7 and 8, as did the percentage of federal cases in which the Court 
applied constitutional law.
122
 The sharp increase in constitutionalization of claims 
against federal government actors after 1972 is an important trend that has 
received too little scholarly attention. Further analysis is necessary to explain this 
development.  
 
Constitutionalization of Federal Cases in the Twentieth Century 
 
 Period 6 
(1936-54) 
Period 7 
(1954-72) 
Period 8 
(1972-2005) 
Percentage of Federal Cases 
in Which Private Party 
Challenged Legislation 
35.5% 28.4% 34.4% 
Percentage of Federal Cases 
in Which Private Party 
Raised Con Law Claim 
34.2% 36.8% 59.3% 
Percentage of Federal Cases 
in Which Supreme Court 
Applied Con Law 
28.4% 30.8% 49.6% 
 
III. 
The Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law Litigation 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that public law litigation in the United States 
is a modern development.
123
 The novelty of public law litigation depends partly 
upon definition of the term. As defined above, public law cases accounted for a 
significant portion of the Supreme Court caseload in the nineteenth century. The 
Court decided more than 3000 public law cases in the nineteenth century.
124
 Part 
Three presents a narrative account of the history of nineteenth century public law 
litigation. 
                                                 
120
 The data in the table on this page is drawn from Tables Three and Five in the Appendix. Those 
tables provide confidence intervals for every estimate. The notes to those tables explain the 
derivation of the estimates.  
121
 See Appendix, Table Five. 
122
 See Appendix, Table Three. 
123
 See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 27, at 4. 
124
 See Appendix, Table One. 
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Part Three is divided into four sections. The first section presents an 
overview of nineteenth century public law cases where the Court applied 
international law. The next two sections present case studies to illustrate 
application of a polymorphous model of public law litigation. The case studies 
address: 1) land claims arising from the 1803 Louisiana treaty and the 1819 
Florida treaty; and 2) Chinese immigration cases from 1882 to 1905. The final 
section summarizes key conclusions. The case studies demonstrate that federal 
courts can provide robust protection for individual rights without applying 
constitutional law and without invalidating legislation approved by popularly 
elected legislatures. 
 
A. Nineteenth Century International Law Claims 
 
Many nineteenth century cases involving judicial application of 
international law were private law cases. However, the nineteenth century 
Supreme Court also applied international law to help resolve numerous public law 
controversies. Broadly speaking, those public law cases include admiralty, real 
property, and other cases. Figure Ten shows that the mix of international law 
cases changed over time.
125
 
 
During the Marshall Court (period 1), admiralty cases accounted for about 
two-thirds of the public law cases where litigants raised international law 
claims.
126
 Most of those admiralty cases involved allegations that a federal 
government agent seized private property in violation of customary international 
law. In many cases, the private party invoked international law as a defense to a 
prize proceeding or a civil forfeiture action initiated by the government.
127
 In 
other cases, the private party filed suit against a government actor to obtain 
damages or restitution for wrongful seizure of property.
128
 A few cases involved 
criminal prosecutions for piracy.
129
 Although many of the Marshall Court 
                                                 
125
 The percentages shown in Figure Ten are estimates based on the phase two database. 
126
 See Figure Ten; see also BENJAMIN MUNN ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN 
MARSHALL: A STUDY OF FIRST PRINCIPLES (1939). 
127
 See, e.g., The Josefa Segunda, 18 U.S. 338 (1820) (civil forfeiture action); The Friendschaft, 16 
U.S. 14 (1818) (privateer captured vessel and initiated prize proceeding); The Julia, 12 U.S. 181 
(1814) (War of 1812 prize case). The prize cases from this era include some captures by U.S. 
naval vessels and some captures by privateers. I count privateers as government agents if they 
acted on the basis of a commission issued by the government. 
128
 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362 (1824) (suit for damages against U.S. customs collector); 
Maley v. Jared Shattuck, 7 U.S. 458 (1806) (ordering federal officer to pay restitution for violation 
of customary international law). About 25% of the Marshall Court admiralty cases included in 
Figure Ten were initiated by private parties. The remaining 75% were initiated by government 
actors. 
129
 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 
(1818). In Figure Ten, piracy cases count as “other,” not “admiralty,” because they are criminal 
cases. 
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admiralty cases were private law disputes,
130
 all the cases included in Figure Ten 
are public law cases. 
 
Figure Ten 
Supreme Court Public Law Cases 
Involving International Law, 1801-1888 
 
 
 
During the Taney Court (period 2), about ninety percent of the public law 
cases where litigants raised international law claims involved disputes over real 
property.
131
 Most of those cases arose under the 1803 treaty acquiring Louisiana 
from France, or the 1819 treaty acquiring Florida from Spain.
132
 Part III.B 
addresses land claims arising from these treaties.  
 
In the aftermath of the Civil War (period 3), the public law cases where 
litigants raised international law claims included a mix of admiralty, real property, 
and other cases.
133
 The admiralty cases included many prize cases arising from 
the Civil War.
134
 The real property cases included many cases arising from the 
treaty acquiring California from Mexico;
135
 they were broadly similar to the 
                                                 
130
 See, e.g., La Nereyda, 21 U.S. 108 (1823); The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818). 
131
 See Figure Ten. 
132
 See Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200 [hereinafter 
Louisiana Treaty]; Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 
[hereinafter Florida Treaty]. 
133
 See Figure Ten. 
134
 See, e.g., United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406 (1874); The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. 28 (1866). 
135
 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 
[hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. 
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earlier Louisiana/Florida cases.
136
 The “other” cases defy generalization. Many 
arose under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act,
137
 a federal statute that 
authorized individuals to file claims against the United States to obtain 
compensation for property captured during the Civil War.
138
 Others involved 
treaties with Native American tribes,
139
 Chinese immigration cases,
140
 claims 
against state tax collectors,
141
 disputes over import duties,
142
 and a variety of other 
issues. 
 
B.  Land Claims in Florida and Louisiana 
 
The United States acquired Louisiana from France under an 1803 treaty; it 
acquired Florida from Spain under an 1819 treaty. Both treaties protected the 
property rights of individuals who owned land under the prior sovereign.
143
 The 
treaties restated principles of customary international law, which held that transfer 
of territory between sovereign states does not affect individual property rights. 
Chief Justice Marshall summarized the law as follows:  
 
The people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient 
sovereign is dissolved; but their . . . rights of property, remain 
undisturbed . . . . Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act 
containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the 
right of property in all those who became subjects or citizens of the 
new government would have been unaffected by the change; it 
would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign. . . . 
The king cedes that only which belonged to him; lands he had 
previously granted, were not his to cede.
144
  
 
                                                 
136
 See CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TANEY 
PERIOD: 1836-64, at 773-810 (1974). 
137
 An Act to Provide for the Collection of Abandoned Property and for the Prevention of Frauds 
in Insurrectionary Districts within the United States, 12 Stat. 820 (Mar. 12, 1863). 
138
 See Elizabeth Lee Thompson, Reconstructing the Practice: The Effects of Expanded Federal 
Judicial Power on Postbellum Lawyers, 43 Am. J. Legal Hist. 306 (1999). The Court of Claims 
decided more than 1500 cases arising under this statute between 1868 and 1875. See id. at 307-09. 
The Supreme Court decided approximately two dozen such cases in the decades after the Civil 
War, many of which involved application of international law. See Lee & Sloss, supra note 18, at 
131-32. 
139
 See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870). 
140
 See infra Part III.C. 
141
 See Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878). 
142
 See, e.g., In re Cliquot’s Champagne, 70 U.S. 114 (1866). 
143
 See Louisiana Treaty, supra note 132, art. 3; Florida Treaty, supra note 132, art. 8. The 1848 
treaty acquiring California from Mexico included a similar provision. See Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, supra note 135, art. 8. 
144
 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87 (1833). 
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From Marshall’s standpoint, this was not merely a principle of international law; 
it was also a matter of fundamental rights. He said: “that sense of justice and of 
right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be 
outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights 
annulled.”145  
 
The principle was easier to state than to apply. Two factors presented 
difficulties. First, many claimants produced ostensible titles tainted by fraud.
146
 
Given widespread allegations of fraud, Congress established administrative 
tribunals (known as land commissions) to distinguish between valid and 
fraudulent claims, and provided for judicial review of administrative decisions.
147
 
The laws governing land commissions varied by region, but the commissions 
typically reported to Congress, whereupon Congress enacted statutes confirming 
individual titles as recommended by the commissioners.
148
 Second, the varied 
practices of French and Spanish officials who issued land grants before the U.S. 
acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida gave rise to a bewildering array of imperfect 
(or inchoate) titles.
149
 Supreme Court doctrine that developed between 1830 and 
1850 established that individuals who held complete (or perfect) titles before the 
relevant treaty of cession did not have to present their claims to land 
commissions; the treaties confirmed the validity of perfect titles.
150
 However, 
individuals who held inchoate titles had to apply to land commissions, pursuant to 
procedures established by Congress, before the government would confirm their 
titles.
151
  
                                                 
145
 Id. at 87. 
146
 See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY 
OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 124-25 (1937). 
147
 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 26, § 5, 2 Stat. 324, 327-28 (authorizing President to appoint 
commissioners for claims in Louisiana); Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 173, § 1, 2 Stat. 52 (providing 
for judicial review of land claims in Missouri); Act of May 8, 1822, ch. 129, 3 Stat. 709 
(authorizing President to appoint commissioners for claims in Florida); Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 
70, § 6, 4 Stat. 284 (providing for judicial review of land claims in Florida). See also Act of Mar. 
2, 1805, ch. 26, 2 Stat. 324, 324-25 n.(a) (summarizing legislation between 1804 and 1844 relating 
to land claims in Louisiana and Florida). 
148
 See, e.g., An Act for the confirmation of certain claims in the western district of Louisiana, and 
in the territory of Missouri, April 29, 1816, chap. 159; An Act confirming the titles to lots in the 
town of Mobile, and in the former province of West Florida, which claims have been favourably 
reported on by the commissioners appointed by the United States, May 7, 1822, chap. 122; An Act 
to confirm claims to lands in the district between the Rio Hondo and Sabine river, May 24, 1828, 
chap. 92. 
149
 See Harry L. Coles, Jr., Applicability of the Public Land System to Louisiana, 43 Miss. Valley 
Hist. Rev. 39, 41 (1956). 
150
 See David Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-
Executing Treaties, 53 Harv. Int’l L. J. 135, 150-51 (2012); see also United States v. Roselius, 56 
U.S. 31, 34 (1853); McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. 693, 706 (1845). 
151
 See, e.g., Menard’s Heirs v. Massey, 49 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1850); United States v. Wiggins, 39 
U.S. 334, 350 (1840). 
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Between 1830 and 1860, the Supreme Court decided approximately one 
hundred cases involving land disputes arising from the Louisiana and Florida 
treaties.
152
 Some were private disputes between private parties,
153
 but most were 
public law disputes between the United States and individuals who asserted titles 
based on French or Spanish grants. “In the whole of the Louisiana Purchase, there 
were between 13,000 and 14,000 such claims.”154 Claims arising from the 
Louisiana Purchase covered about seven million acres.
155
 Supreme Court 
decisions in the Florida cases affected “fifteen million acres . . . covering about 
one-third of the state.”156 The stakes were high because, during this period, “for 
all the growth of industry and steady accumulation of capital in other forms, land 
was the principal form and source of wealth in the country.”157 
 
 1. The Role of International Law: Litigants in the Louisiana/Florida land 
cases routinely invoked rights protected by international law. Federal statutes 
governed the procedural rules, but claimants’ substantive rights depended on 
foreign and international law. In most cases, French or Spanish law determined 
the validity of the initial land grant.
158
 However, neither French nor Spanish law 
protected individuals from adverse claims by the federal government. In every 
case, the individual’s substantive rights vis-à-vis the United States depended on 
treaties and/or customary international law. Under international law, any 
individual who had a valid claim against the French or Spanish government 
before the treaty of cession had an equally valid claim against the United States 
after the change of sovereignty.
159
 Conventional wisdom holds that nineteenth 
century international law did not protect U.S. citizens from their own government. 
That view is mistaken. The Louisiana/Florida cases rarely specify the citizenship 
of claimants, but many of them were undoubtedly U.S. citizens. Moreover, 
citizenship was irrelevant. Both citizens and non-citizens were protected by the 
relevant rules of international law. 
                                                 
152
 See SWISHER, supra note 136, at 747 (stating that “controversies over land titles in the 
Louisiana Purchase gave rise to some fifty major cases in the Supreme Court . . . From Florida the 
Supreme Court also decided some fifty cases . . . .”). 
153
 See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
154
 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 146, at 120. There are no reliable estimates of the 
number of claims under the Florida treaty, but that treaty probably gave rise to a comparable 
number of claims. 
155
 Id., at 120. 
156
 SWISHER, supra note 136, at 747-48. 
157
 Id., at 747. 
158
 In a few cases, the Court determined that a Spanish grant was invalid because Spain purported 
to grant land to someone after the U.S. acquired sovereignty. See, e.g., Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 
(1838). In such cases, the initial grant was invalid not because of Spanish law, but because Spain 
did not have sovereignty over the property it purported to grant. 
159
 See, e.g., United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334, 350 (1840) (“the United States were bound, 
after the cession of the country, to the same extent that Spain had been bound before the 
ratification of the treaty”).  
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 The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Arredondo is 
illustrative.
160
 The grant at issue in Arredondo “covered an area of 289,645 acres . 
. . It embraced nearly the entire northeastern coast of Florida, including 
Jacksonville and other cities.”161 Former Attorney General William Wirt and 
Attorney General Roger Taney argued the case for the government. Former 
Attorney General John Berrien and Daniel Webster represented the private 
claimants.
162
 “The government attacked the claim as fraudulent, denied the legal 
power of the Cuban army intendant to make the grant, [and] argued that the lands 
were within the Indian boundary and not subject to grant.”163 The Supreme Court 
rejected all these arguments, ruling decisively for the private claimants. The Court 
emphasized that “[t]he treaty and the acts of Congress were to be liberally 
construed, [and] the acts of foreign public officers were presumed to be 
lawful.”164 
 
Later commentators noted that Arredondo “served as the most important 
legal precedent for the entire body of Louisiana, Florida, and later California land 
cases.”165 Arredondo established a key legal precedent for protecting property 
rights from government infringement. However, the Court did not apply 
constitutional law to protect individuals from government overreaching. Instead, 
the Court applied international and foreign law to constrain federal executive 
power. Summarizing the body of precedent derived from Arredondo, the Supreme 
Court later said, “the claims shall be adjudged, and the equities of the claimants 
determined and settled according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the 
treaty, and . . . the laws and ordinances of the government from which the claims 
are alleged to have been derived.”166 In short, the Court applied a polymorphous 
model, drawing on multiple sources of law to resolve individual claims against 
the government. 
 
Private litigants had great success litigating property claims against the 
federal government. Between 1832 and 1836, Joseph Mills White, the foremost 
U.S. expert on Spanish land law, represented private claimants before the 
Supreme Court in 24 cases involving the Louisiana and Florida treaties.
167
 He 
won a partial or total victory in 23 of 24 cases,
168
 relying on international and 
foreign law to protect individual rights from government encroachment. Few, if 
any, modern Supreme Court litigators can claim a comparable success rate. 
                                                 
160
 31 U.S. 691 (1832). 
161
 Id. at 126. 
162
 Id. at 127. 
163
 Id. 
164
 Id. 
165
 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 146, at 127. 
166
 United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334, 350 (1840). 
167
 See ERNEST F. DIBBLE, JOSEPH MILLS WHITE: ANTI-JACKSONIAN FLORIDIAN 173-81 (2003). 
168
 See id., at 134, 173-81. 
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 2. The Mobile Waterfront Cases: Between 1840 and 1850, the Court 
decided seven cases involving waterfront property in Mobile, Alabama.
169
 Those 
cases affected title to “a most valuable portion, and a very large portion, of the 
second [largest] city on the Gulf of Mexico, in wealth and population.”170 They 
are important doctrinally because the Court held in two cases that certain federal 
statutes were void.
171
 They are the only two cases in the entire line of Florida, 
Louisiana, and California land claims where the Court invalidated a federal 
statute. 
 
The city of Mobile is located in a region that was subject to a territorial 
dispute between the United States and Spain from 1803 to 1819. Spain claimed 
the territory as part of Florida. The U.S. claimed that it acquired the land from 
France in 1803 as part of Louisiana. The dispute was not resolved until the U.S. 
acquired Florida from Spain in 1819.
172
   
 
Despite U.S. claims of sovereignty, Spain exercised de facto control over 
Mobile and surrounding areas until about October 1810, when the President 
“ordered military possession to be taken of the disputed territory.”173 Between 
1803 and 1810, Spanish authorities issued numerous land grants in the region. 
The Supreme Court consistently held that Spanish grants in the disputed territory 
after 1803 did not convey legal title because Spain did not have de jure 
sovereignty.
174
 However, the Court held that Spain’s de facto control gave it the 
“power to grant” inchoate titles.175 Moreover, the United States had an obligation 
under customary international law to respect the inchoate property rights of 
Spanish grantees,
176
 and Congress had power to grant legal titles to individuals 
who held inchoate rights based on Spanish grants.
177
 Congress “in more than a 
                                                 
169
 Goodtitle ex dem Pollard v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471 (1850); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); 
Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591 (1844); City of Mobile v. Emanuel, 42 U.S. 95 (1843); City 
of Mobile v. Hallett, 41 U.S. 261 (1842); City of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234 (1842); Lessee of 
Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 (1840). The four “Pollard” cases were private disputes; the 
three “City of Mobile” cases were public law cases. I address all seven cases together because they 
are all related. 
170
 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 233 (1845) (Catron, J., dissenting). 
171
 Goodtitle ex dem Pollard v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471 (1850); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
172
 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 300-09 (1829) (explaining the history of the dispute). 
173
 Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 370 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
174
 See Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
175
 See Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. 353, 364-66; Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591, 602-05 
(1844).  
176
 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. Some Justices argued that the U.S. also had an 
obligation under the Florida Treaty. See, e.g., Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. 353, 388 (Baldwin, J., 
concurring). However, the majority held that the U.S. incurred no legal obligations under the 
Florida Treaty concerning land west of the Perdido River because the U.S. acquired that land from 
France in 1803. See Lessee of Pollard, 43 U.S. 591, 602. 
177
 See Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. at 365 (“Such claims are certainly not beyond the reach of 
Congress to confirm, although it may require a special act of Congress for that purpose.”) 
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thousand instances respected and confirmed such titles,”178 relying implicitly on 
this chain of reasoning. 
 
In five of the Mobile waterfront cases, the Court affirmed the validity of 
land titles based on a combination of Spanish grants and federal legislation. In 
Lessee of Pollard v. Files
179
 and Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe,180 the Court 
affirmed land titles based on: an 1809 Spanish grant to William Pollard; an 1824 
federal statute conveying U.S. property rights to the city of Mobile, but preserving 
the rights of individuals who obtained Spanish grants “during the time at which 
they [Spain] had the power to grant the same”;181 and an 1836 federal statute 
confirming the title of “the heirs of William Pollard.”182 In City of Mobile v. 
Emanuel
183
 and City of Mobile v. Hallett,
184
 the Court affirmed the titles of 
Spanish grantees, but did not cite any federal legislation specifically confirming 
the validity of those titles. And in City of Mobile v. Eslava,
185
 the Court affirmed 
the validity of an individual title “acquired by purchase from the United States, at 
a public sale in 1820” pursuant to an 1818 federal statute.186 
 
However, the Court changed course in its 1845 decision in Pollard v. 
Hagan.
187
 To understand Hagan, an explanation of the local geography is 
necessary.
188
 At that time, Water Street ran north-south on the eastern edge of 
Mobile. The land west of Water Street was dry. During the Spanish occupation, 
the land east of Water Street was above water at low tide, but under water at high 
tide. Despite the tidal flow, the Spanish government issued several grants for land 
east of Water Street. That land remained under water at high tide until 1822 or 
1823, when people constructed levees. All the Mobile waterfront cases involved 
land east of Water Street that was under water at high tide before 1822. 
                                                                                                                                     
Congressional power was based on Article IV of the Constitution, which grants Congress “Power 
to dispose of . . . the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. Const. art. 
IV, § 3, cl. 2. If an individual held an inchoate title before the U.S. acquired sovereignty, then the 
legal title passed to the United States under the treaty, “with the equity attached in the claimant.” 
McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. 693, 706 (1845). Property subject to an equitable claim was 
federal land until the U.S. confirmed the claimant’s title. See Sloss, supra note 150, at 151. 
178
 Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. at 358 (argument of Daniel Webster, plaintiffs’ counsel). The number 
“thousand” refers to land grants in the entire area of the territorial dispute with Spain, not just land 
in Mobile.  
179
 43 U.S. 591 (1844). 
180
 39 U.S. 353 (1840). 
181
 Id., at 362 (quoting Act of May 26, 1824). 
182
 Id., at 366 (quoting Act of July 2, 1836). 
183
 42 U.S. 95 (1843). 
184
 41 U.S. 261 (1842). 
185
 41 U.S. 234 (1842). 
186
 Id. at 243. 
187
 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
188
 The following description is drawn from the cases cited in note 169 supra. 
Polymorphous Public Law Litigation 
David Sloss, Draft, January 2014 
 
43 
 
Congress admitted Alabama as a State in December 1819. In Pollard v. 
Hagan,
189
 the Court held that statehood gave Alabama sovereignty over all the 
“navigable waters, and the soils under them” within the state’s territorial limits.190 
Statehood therefore terminated Congress’ power under Article IV of the 
Constitution to make “Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States,”191 insofar as Congress purported to 
exercise that power over “the shores of navigable waters” inside Alabama.192 
Since the property at issue was waterfront property, “[t]he right of the United 
States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules 
and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to 
the plaintiffs the land in controversy in this case.”193 Hence, the federal statutes on 
which the Court based its holdings in Lessee of Pollard v. Files
194
 and Lessee of 
Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe195 were void because those statutes, enacted in 1824 and 
1836, purported to confirm or convey title to land that was not subject to federal 
control after 1819. Similarly, the 1820 land sale that was the basis for the 
individual’s title in City of Mobile v. Eslava196 was also presumably void.197 
 
The Court reaffirmed Hagan’s central holding in Goodtitle ex dem Pollard 
v. Kibbe.
198
 However, thirty years later the Court partially overruled Hagan by 
holding that the United States can exercise its power of eminent domain within 
the territorial borders of a State.
199
 Interestingly, the Court relied partly on 
international law to justify its view of the federal eminent domain power.
200
 
 
3. Comparison to Modern Public Law Cases: The Louisiana/Florida land 
cases are similar in several respects to modern public law litigation. The land 
cases involved judicial review of administrative decisions made pursuant to 
federal statutes creating specialized tribunals (the land commissions). The cases 
raised generic conflicts between private parties and federal officials whose 
mission was to safeguard public goods without adversely affecting private rights. 
Consider an analogy to modern disability cases. In those cases, private claimants 
                                                 
189
 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
190
 Id. at 228-29. 
191
 U.S. Const. art. IV § 3, cl. 2. 
192
 44 U.S., at 230. 
193
 Id. 
194
 43 U.S. 591 (1844). 
195
 39 U.S. 353 (1840). 
196
 41 U.S. 234 (1842). 
197
 By the same logic, numerous federal statutes concerning title to land in Louisiana enacted after 
Louisiana became a State would also be void, but the Court never pursued this line of reasoning to 
its logical conclusion. 
198
 50 U.S. 471 (1850). 
199
 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
200
 See id. at 371-72 (citing Vattel and Bynkershoek for the proposition that the power of eminent 
domain “is inseparable from sovereignty”). 
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assert an entitlement to public goods (federal dollars). Federal officers have a 
statutory duty to protect public goods from unworthy claimants and to distribute 
those goods to worthy claimants. Similarly, in the nineteenth century land cases 
private claimants asserted an entitlement to public goods (federal lands). Federal 
officers had a statutory duty to protect those public goods from unworthy 
claimants,
201
 but they also had a duty (under treaties and customary international 
law) to confirm the titles of worthy claimants. Thus, the nineteenth century land 
cases are structurally similar to certain modern administrative law cases. 
  
One surprisingly modern feature of the nineteenth century land cases was 
the prevalence of “cause lawyering.” In the mid-nineteenth century, the Court was 
ideologically divided between Justices sympathetic to individuals who asserted 
property rights based on French or Spanish grants, and Justices who favored the 
federal government’s power to distribute land to its chosen grantees.202 Joseph 
Mills White represented individual claimants before the Supreme Court in at least 
24 land cases.
203
 Daniel Webster argued several cases on behalf of private 
claimants,
204
 joining White as co-counsel in two very significant cases.
205
 White 
represented individual claimants because he was committed to the “Jeffersonian 
belief . . . in small landholding as the secret to the creation and maintenance of a 
viable democracy.”206 Similarly, Webster represented individual claimants 
because he believed, based on “[f]irst principles of justice drawn from natural 
law,” that “government must recognize claims of title to ownership . . . and must 
assure a large measure of freedom in the uses of property.”207 
 
Modern lawyers might frame property rights claims against the 
government as Fifth Amendment Takings claims. However, the lawyers who 
litigated the Louisiana/Florida property cases rarely invoked constitutional law to 
frame their arguments,
208
 and the Court rarely applied constitutional law to decide 
                                                 
201
 See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 146, at 123-24 (noting that Attorney General John 
Crittenden, during his tenure as Attorney General, succeeded in “saving nearly two million acres 
for the public domain”). 
202
 See SWISHER, supra note 136, at 748. 
203
 See DIBBLE, supra note 167, at 173-81. 
204
 See MAURICE G. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER & THE SUPREME COURT 143-45 (1966). 
205
 White and Webster served as co-counsel in Arredondo, discussed above, as well as Mitchel v. 
United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835). Mitchel was significant because the Court granted about 1.2 
million acres of land to private claimants, the largest single victory (in terms of acreage) for 
private claimants in any of the Louisiana/Florida land cases. 
206
 DIBBLE, supra note 167, at 159. 
207
 BAXTER, supra note 204, at 142. 
208
 From the perspective of individual claimants who held inchoate titles based on French or 
Spanish grants, government efforts to seize their land probably seemed like a taking of private 
property for public use. From the government’s standpoint, there was no Taking because the 
government actually held legal title to the property after the transfer of sovereignty from France or 
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the cases. In the pre-Civil War era, a constitutional claim challenging a 
governmental taking of private property would probably have failed because key 
legal precedents supported the government’s power to seize private property 
without paying compensation.
209
 Regardless, claimants did not need constitutional 
law to protect their rights from government infringement because the courts 
protected their rights through vigorous enforcement of international law. 
 
C. Chinese Habeas Litigation 
 
Between 1882 and 1905, Chinese petitioners seeking admission into the 
United States filed thousands of habeas corpus petitions in federal courts.
210
 
Despite restrictive immigration laws designed to exclude Chinese immigrants, 
petitioners won a very high proportion of those cases. Judicial decisions relied 
primarily on international law, not constitutional law, to support the entry rights 
of Chinese petitioners. The Supreme Court did not invalidate any federal law 
restricting Chinese immigration during this period.
211
 Thus, the analysis shows 
that courts can provide robust protection for individual rights in a manner 
consistent with principles of popular sovereignty by applying international law to 
constrain government power and protect individual rights. The following narrative 
is divided into three time periods: 1868-88, 1888-94, and 1894-l905. 
 
1. Period One — 1868-1888: China and the United States concluded the 
Burlingame Treaty in 1868.
212
 Evoking natural law, the treaty affirmed the 
“inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home.”213 Both countries 
promised to allow “free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, 
respectively, from the one country to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, 
or as permanent residents.”214 By 1880, more than 100,000 Chinese nationals 
were living in the United States.
215
 The influx of immigrants produced a political 
backlash, resulting in a wave of anti-Chinese legislation. Responding to political 
                                                                                                                                     
Spain. See supra note 177. However, that view was contestable. Lawyers could reasonably have 
presented the claims as Fifth Amendment Takings claims. 
209
 See DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY: PROPERTY CONFISCATION IN THE 
UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL WAR 1-4 (2007). 
210
 This section focuses solely on “exclusion” cases, where the government sought to prevent 
Chinese persons from entering the United States. It does not address “deportation” cases, where 
the government sought to remove someone who had entered previously. 
211
 The Court did invalidate some state laws that discriminated against Chinese residents. See, e.g., 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). And in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 
(1896), the Court invalidated a federal statute subjecting Chinese persons to criminal penalties 
without granting them Fifth or Sixth Amendment jury rights. 
212
 Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739. 
213
 Id., art. V. 
214
 Id. 
215
 See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF 
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 7-8 (1995). 
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pressure to restrict Chinese immigration, President Hayes appointed a commission 
to renegotiate the treaty with China.
216
  
 
The new treaty, concluded in 1880, allowed the United States to restrict, 
but not prohibit, immigration of Chinese laborers “[w]henever in the opinion of 
the Government of the United States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the 
United States, or their residence therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests 
of that country, or to endanger the good order of the said country . . . .”217 
Although the treaty permitted restrictions on immigration of Chinese laborers, 
“[t]he limitation . . . shall apply only to Chinese who may go to the United States 
as laborers, other classes not being included in the limitations.”218 The treaty 
provided that “teachers, students, [and] merchants,” as well as laborers who 
resided in the United States before entry into force of the treaty, “shall be allowed 
to go and come of their own free will and accord.”219 Thus, the new treaty 
attempted to balance the populist desire to exclude Chinese immigrants with the 
natural law commitment to the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change 
his home.”220 
 
After conclusion of the 1880 treaty, Congress enacted the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, suspending immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years, 
as permitted by the treaty.
221
 The Act gave primary enforcement responsibility to 
customs collectors at ports of entry.
222
 The collector in San Francisco “adopted a 
very strict reading of the act” and denied entry to numerous prospective 
immigrants.
223
 The Chinese responded by filing habeas petitions in the Northern 
District of California. The federal court adopted a more expansive view of 
Chinese entry rights than the customs collector. Consequently, “[w]ithin fourteen 
months of the act’s passage . . . the federal courts were directly or indirectly 
responsible for the entry of one-third of all Chinese landed during that period.”224 
Judicial decisions granting habeas petitions invoked treaties with China as the 
primary source of rights for Chinese immigrants.
225
 
                                                 
216
 Id., at 12-14. 
217
 Treaty Concerning Immigration, U.S.-China, art. I, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. 
218
 Id. 
219
 Id., art. II. 
220
 Burlingame Treaty, supra note 212, art. V. 
221
 Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58. 
222
 See id., sec. 9. 
223
 SALYER, supra note 215, at 18. 
224
 Id., at 19 (citing Hudson N. Janisch, “The Chinese, the Courts, and the Constitution: A Study of 
the Legal Issues Raised by Chinese Immigration, 1850-1902 (1971)). 
225
 See, e.g., In re Chin A On, 18 F. 506, 507 (D.C. Cal. 1883) (“before we can impute to congress 
an intention to violate an important article of a treaty with a foreign power, that intention must be 
clearly and unequivocally manifested, and the language of the law, which is supposed to constitute 
the violation, must admit of no other reasonable construction”); Case of the Chinese Merchant, 13 
F. 605 (C.C. Cal. 1882) (“we will not assume, in the absence of plain language to the contrary, 
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In 1884, Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act to create additional 
hurdles for prospective immigrants.
226
 Under the 1880 treaty and the 1882 statute, 
Chinese laborers who lived in the United States before passage of the 1882 Act 
retained the right to exit and return. Not surprisingly, customs collectors had 
difficulty distinguishing between Chinese who actually resided in the U.S. before 
1882, and those who falsely claimed prior residence to gain entry.
227
 The 1882 
Act addressed this problem by allowing Chinese laborers to obtain a certificate 
before leaving the country.
228
 The certificate entitled Chinese laborers to “re-enter 
the United States upon producing and delivering the same to the collector of 
customs.”229 The 1884 Amendment tightened the rules by providing that “said 
certificate shall be the only evidence permissible to establish his right of re-
entry.”230 
 
Despite the clear statutory mandate, the Supreme Court soon decided two 
cases holding that “said certificate” was not the only evidence permissible to 
establish a right of entry. In Chew Heong v. United States,
231
 the Court held that a 
Chinese laborer who resided in the U.S. before passage of the 1882 Act, left the 
country without a certificate before enactment of the 1884 Amendment, and then 
sought re-entry after passage of the 1884 Amendment, was entitled to enter the 
country without a certificate. The Court stated: “[S]ince the purpose avowed in 
the act was to faithfully execute the treaty, any interpretation of its provisions 
would be rejected which imputes to congress an intention to disregard the plighted 
faith of the government, and, consequently, the court ought, if possible, to adopt 
that construction which recognized and saved rights secured by the treaty.”232 
Similarly, in United States v. Jung Ah Lung,
233
 the Court held that a Chinese 
laborer who claimed that his certificate was stolen was entitled to re-enter if he 
could prove prior residence by other means. 
 
Between passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and passage of the 
Scott Act in 1888 (discussed below), federal courts consistently adopted a more 
generous view of Chinese entry rights than the customs collector in San 
Francisco. By 1888, “4091 Chinese had petitioned the federal courts for a 
hearing.” The courts granted petitioners entry rights in 85 percent of Chinese 
                                                                                                                                     
that congress intended to disregard the obligations of the original treaty of 1868, which remains in 
full force except as modified by the supplementary treaty of 1880”). 
226
 Act of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 115. 
227
 Most of the officials responsible for enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Act “shared the belief . . . 
that the Chinese and their witnesses lied to gain entry.” SALYER, supra note 215, at 76. 
228
 Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58, sec. 4. 
229
 Id. 
230
 Act of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 115, sec. 4 (emphasis added). 
231
 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
232
 Id., at 549. 
233
 124 U.S. 621 (1888). 
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habeas cases.
234
 Although the Chinese Exclusion Act was clearly intended to 
restrict immigration, the courts construed the Act broadly to protect the treaty-
based entry rights of Chinese immigrants. Courts justified their decisions by 
invoking the principle that statutes should be construed in conformity with U.S. 
treaty obligations.
235
 In sum, the courts provided robust protection for Chinese 
entry rights without applying constitutional law and without invalidating any 
federal legislation governing Chinese immigration. 
 
2. Period Two — 1888-1894:  Congress enacted the Scott Act in 1888.236 
The 1882 and 1884 Acts could plausibly be construed consistently with the 1880 
treaty. In the Scott Act, though, Congress made unmistakably clear that it did not 
intend to comply with the treaty. Although the treaty guaranteed Chinese laborers 
who resided in the United States before 1880 the right to “go and come of their 
own free will,”237 the Scott Act provided that “it shall be unlawful for any 
Chinese laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been . . .  a resident within 
the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart, therefrom, and 
shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to . . .  the United 
States.”238 To avert any possible misinterpretation, Congress added that “every 
certificate heretofore issued . . . is hereby declared void . . . and the Chinese 
laborer claiming admission by virtue thereof shall not be permitted to enter the 
United States.”239 
 
In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
240
 a Chinese laborer who held a 
certificate under the 1884 Act tried to enter the country.
241
 The customs collector 
denied him entry in reliance on the Scott Act because the Act declared the 
certificate void.
242
 Chae Chan Ping challenged the constitutionality of the Act, 
arguing that it constituted an illegal “expulsion from the country of Chinese 
laborers, in violation of existing treaties between the United States and the 
government of China, and of rights vested in them under the laws of Congress.”243 
The Supreme Court upheld the Act. The Court acknowledged that the Act 
contravened “express stipulations of the treaty of 1868, and of the supplemental 
treaty of 1880.”244 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that “the last expression of the 
                                                 
234
 SALYER, supra note 215, at 20. 
235
 See supra notes 225, 232, and accompanying text; see also In re Tung Yeong, 19 F. 184, 185 
(D.C. Cal. 1884). 
236
 Scott Act, Oct. 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504. 
237
 Treaty Concerning Immigration, U.S.-China, art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. 
238
 Scott Act, Oct. 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504, sec. 1. 
239
 Id., sec. 2. 
240
 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
241
 Id., at 582. 
242
 Id. 
243
 Id., at 589. 
244
 Id., at 600. 
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sovereign will must control.”245 The Court’s opinion is replete with language 
affirming the principle that courts must give judicial effect to statutes enacted by 
democratic legislatures. 
 
After Chae Chan Ping, Chinese nationals could no longer enter the 
country as laborers. Nevertheless, Chinese immigrants continued to litigate 
habeas petitions with great success by claiming a right to enter the country as 
merchants,
246
 U.S. citizens,
247
 or the wives or children of merchants or citizens.
248
 
In December 1890, a customs inspector testified that, between passage of the 
Scott Act and November 30, 1890, the federal court in San Francisco granted 
almost two thousand habeas petitions filed by Chinese immigrants, but denied 
only 157 petitions.
249
  Thus, Chinese petitioners won almost 93% of the habeas 
petitions filed within the first 26 months after passage of the Scott Act. Overall, 
between 1882 and 1891, “the Chinese filed more than seven thousand petitions 
for habeas corpus, and the court attracted the wrath of the public and the 
administrative officials by allowing the vast majority of these Chinese to enter 
freely.”250 
 
Congress enacted a new immigration law in 1891.
251
 The 1891 Act barred 
judicial review of administrative decisions denying entry to non-citizens.
252
 
However, the prohibition of judicial review did not apply to Chinese 
immigrants.
253
 Consequently, federal courts continued to grant Chinese habeas 
petitions. Professor Salyer determined that the federal district court in San 
Francisco granted Chinese habeas petitions at an annual rate of 73% in 1891, 88% 
in 1892, 66% in 1893, and 80% in 1894.
254
  
 
Lau Ow Bew v. United States
255
 illustrates the types of cases litigated in 
the early 1890s. Petitioner had lived in the United States for seventeen years. 
During that time he was “engaged in the wholesale and importing mercantile 
                                                 
245
 Id. 
246
 See, e.g., Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892) (granting entry to Chinese 
merchant). 
247
 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (granting entry to a person of 
Chinese descent who was a U.S. citizen). 
248
 See, e.g., United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459 (1900) (ruling in favor of the wife of a 
Chinese merchant). 
249
 U.S. Congress, Select Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Chinese Immigration, 
51
st
 Cong., 2d Sess., 272-73 (testimony of S. J. Ruddell). 
250
 SALYER, supra note 215, at 33. 
251
 Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084. 
252
 See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
253
 See SALYER, supra note 215, at 26-32. 
254
 See id., at 80. These figures apply only to exclusion cases, not deportation cases. 
255
 144 U.S. 47 (1892). 
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business in the city of Portland,” Oregon.256 He departed the country in September 
1890 to visit relatives in China, returning in August 1891. When he returned he 
produced documents to show he was a merchant. As a merchant, the treaties 
protected his right to enter the country. The customs collector denied entry,
257
 
invoking a statute requiring Chinese merchants to “obtain the permission of . . . 
the Chinese Government . . . in each case to be evidenced by a certificate issued 
by such Government.”258 
 
Chief Justice Fuller asked: “Does the section apply to Chinese merchants, 
already domiciled in the United States, who, having left the country for temporary 
purposes . . . seek to re-enter it on their return to their business and their 
homes?”259 The Court concluded it was absurd to require a merchant who had 
lived in the U.S. for seventeen years to obtain a certificate from the Chinese 
government granting him permission to return to the country.
260
 Fuller applied 
standard principles of statutory interpretation to support this conclusion. He also 
invoked petitioner’s rights under “general international law” and the treaties with 
China.
261
 Finally, he quoted the Court’s prior decision in Chew Heong: “since the 
purpose avowed in the [Chinese Exclusion] act was to faithfully execute the 
treaty, any interpretation of its provisions would be rejected which imputed to 
congress an intention to disregard the plighted faith of the government; and, 
consequently, the court ought, if possible, to adopt that construction which 
recognized and saved rights secured by the treaty.”262 
 
In sum, federal courts applied a combination of statutes and treaties to 
provide judicial protection for the treaty-based rights of Chinese immigrants.
263
 
By applying statutes and treaties, rather than constitutional law,
264
 the courts 
preserved Congress’ prerogative to modify the governing legal rules. Thus, 
Chinese habeas litigation provides an example of polymorphous public law 
litigation that combines robust judicial protection for individual rights with 
genuine judicial respect for popular sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
256
 Lau Ow Bew, 144 U.S. at 48. 
257
 Id., at 48-49. 
258
 Act of July 5, 1884, sec. 6, 23 Stat. 115, 116. 
259
 Lau Ow Bew, 144 U.S., at 59.  
260
 Id., at 59-61. 
261
 Id., at 61-62. 
262
 Id., at 62 (quoting Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 549).  
263
 Non-Chinese immigrants did not fare as well because the 1891 Act barred judicial review of 
administrative decisions in those cases. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
264
 During this period the Court frequently invoked international law in the context of 
constitutional interpretation to support an expansive view of government power that limited 
protection for individual rights. In contrast, the Court used international law in statutory 
interpretation to constrain government power and protect individual rights. See Lee and Sloss, 
supra note 18. 
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3. Period Three — 1894-1905:  In 1894 the United States and China 
concluded a new treaty prohibiting entry of Chinese laborers into the United 
States “for a period of ten years.”265 The treaty reaffirmed that “[t]he provisions of 
this Convention shall not affect the right . . . of Chinese subjects, being officials, 
teachers, students, merchants or travellers for curiosity or pleasure, but not 
laborers, of coming to the United States and residing therein.”266 Thus, as before, 
the 1894 treaty balanced the populist desire to exclude Chinese laborers with the 
natural law commitment to the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change 
his home.”267 
 
Meanwhile, the public was concerned that Chinese petitioners repeatedly 
used habeas corpus to overturn administrative decisions denying them 
admission.
268
 Accordingly, in August 1894 Congress enacted an amendment 
barring judicial review of exclusion decisions. The statute provided: “In every 
case where an alien is excluded from admission into the United States . . . the 
decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the 
admission of such alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary 
of the Treasury.”269 Thus, the statute extended to Chinese immigrants the bar on 
judicial review that previously applied to other non-citizens under the 1891 Act.  
 
In Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
270
 a Chinese merchant with a 
“permanent domicile” in the U.S. filed a petition challenging the customs 
officer’s decision denying him admission when he returned home after a 
temporary business trip to China.
271
 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court 
decision denying habeas relief, saying that the 1894 Act precluded judicial review 
of the customs officer’s decision.272 The Court relied on its prior decision in 
Nishimura Ekiu,
273
 which upheld the validity of the 1891 statute barring judicial 
review of administrative decisions in non-Chinese cases. Justice Harlan, writing 
for the majority in Lem Moon Sing, said there was no principled basis for 
distinguishing between the 1891 statute at issue in Nishimura Ekiu and the 1894 
statute at issue in Lem Moon Sing.
274
 
 
Respectfully, the Court’s decision in Lem Moon Sing was mistaken. Lem 
Moon Sing and Nishimura Ekiu are readily distinguishable. In Nishimura Ekiu, 
                                                 
265
 Convention on Immigration, U.S.-China, art. I, March 17, 1894, 28 Stat. 1210. 
266
 Id., art. III. 
267
 Burlingame Treaty, supra note 212, art. V. 
268
 See SALYER, supra note 215, at 96-97. 
269
 Act of August 18, 1894, 28 Stat. 390. 
270
 158 U.S. 538 (1895). 
271
 Id., at 539-40. 
272
 See id., at 540-49. 
273
 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
274
 See Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 541-47. 
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the petitioner was “a person without means of support, without relatives or friends 
in the United States . . . unable to care for herself, and liable to become a public 
charge.” She was therefore ineligible to enter under the 1891 statute.275 In 
contrast, Lem Moon Sing was a Chinese merchant with a permanent domicile in 
the United States who — based on the facts in the Supreme Court opinion — had 
a clear right to enter under the 1894 treaty. The Court’s opinion in Lem Moon 
Sing provides no indication of any statutory basis for the customs officer’s 
decision to deny entry; his decision may have been entirely arbitrary and 
capricious. Even so, said Justice Harlan, the 1894 statute barred judicial review by 
way of habeas corpus. That conclusion is troubling. The Court could easily have 
held that Congress did not intend to bar judicial review in cases where the 
immigration inspector’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to clearly 
established law.
276
 
 
Lem Moon Sing appeared finally to bar judicial review of habeas petitions 
in Chinese exclusion cases. However, the courts continued to entertain habeas 
petitions from people of Chinese descent who claimed to be U.S. citizens. In 
United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
277
 the Court held that “a child born in the United 
States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth . . . have a 
permanent domicile and residence in the United States . . . becomes at the time of 
his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of” the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
278
 Since the 1894 statute merely barred judicial review in cases 
“where an alien is excluded from admission,”279 persons of Chinese descent who 
claimed birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment could still obtain 
judicial review.  
 
Surprisingly, federal courts continued to grant habeas relief in most cases. 
Between 1895 (when Lem Moon Sing was decided) and 1904, the Northern 
District of California entertained 1559 habeas petitions filed by persons of 
Chinese descent who sought admission to the country. The court granted relief in 
about 55% of those cases.
280
 Chinese habeas litigation finally ended in 1905 when 
the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Ju Toy that federal courts lacked 
                                                 
275
 Nishimura Ekiu, 12 S.Ct. at 337-38. 
276
 The Court’s opinion in Lem Moon Sing presents the issues as if there is a stark choice between 
de novo review or zero review, with no possible middle ground. See Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 
546-47. In this respect, the Court’s opinion is at odds with modern administrative law, which 
recognizes various circumstances where deferential judicial review is appropriate.  
277
 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
278
 Id., at 653. The Fourteenth Amendment specifies: “All persons born . . . in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”  
279
 Act of August 18, 1894, 28 Stat. 390 (emphasis added). 
280
 This figure is based on Table 3 on page 80 of SALYER, supra note 215.  
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jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions filed by persons of Chinese descent who 
claimed birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.
281
 
 
One can legitimately criticize the decisions in Lem Moon Sing and Ju Toy 
on the grounds that the Court caved too quickly to legislative efforts to bar 
judicial review of administrative decisions. The Court could potentially have done 
more to preserve limited judicial review without invalidating statutes approved by 
Congress. Still, the overall record of federal court decisions between 1882 and 
1905 reveals a federal judiciary that was committed to both individual rights and 
popular sovereignty, and that did a creditable job mitigating the tension between 
those competing goals. 
 
D. Summary 
 
The preceding case studies illustrate several points about nineteenth 
century public law litigation. In both the Chinese cases and the Louisiana/Florida 
cases, federal courts relied on international law, not constitutional law, to protect 
individual rights from government infringement. The empirical analysis above 
shows that judicial reliance on international law was a characteristic feature of 
nineteenth century public law litigation. 
 
The rights at issue in both the Chinese cases and the Louisiana/Florida 
cases could reasonably be characterized as “fundamental” rights. The Burlingame 
Treaty affirmed the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home.”282 
John Marshall stated: “that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged 
and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property 
should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled” when territory is 
transferred between sovereigns.
283
 Although many nineteenth century lawyers 
conceived the rights at issue as “fundamental,” they did not constitutionalize those 
rights. The Court could have invoked the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to 
protect property rights in Louisiana and Florida.
284
 It could reasonably have 
invoked the liberty component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to 
protect the “inalienable right of man to change his home.”285 Instead, the courts 
relied on international law, not constitutional law, to protect fundamental rights. 
 
                                                 
281
 198 U.S. 253 (1905). The Court left an opening for petitioners who alleged abuse of authority 
by administrative officers. 
282
 Burlingame Treaty, supra note 212, art. V. 
283
 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833). 
284
 See supra note 208. 
285
 Indeed, the right to freedom of movement is arguably a stronger candidate for substantive 
protection under the Due Process Clause than the right not to be sued in an out-of-state court, 
which the Supreme Court constitutionalized after Pennoyer. See supra notes 7-18 and 
accompanying text. 
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The choice to rely on international law, rather than constitutional law, did 
not undermine judicial protection for individual rights. The property owners in the 
Louisiana/Florida cases and the Chinese immigrants in the habeas cases had 
remarkably successful litigation records.
286
 Indeed, it would be difficult to 
identify any area of modern constitutional litigation where groups have achieved a 
higher winning percentage litigating claims against the federal government. 
 
Finally, nineteenth century public law litigation was broadly consistent 
with principles of popular sovereignty. Although the Supreme Court frequently 
ruled against the federal government in the Louisiana/Florida cases and the 
Chinese cases, the Court rarely invalidated a federal statute.
287
 Moreover, the 
Court typically framed its decisions in ways that avoided placing significant 
restrictions on Congress’ future legislative options. In contrast, the modern 
Supreme Court often issues constitutional decisions invalidating federal 
statutes,
288
 and frames its decisions in ways that impose significant restrictions on 
Congress’ future legislative options.289 Hence, the shift from a polymorphous 
model of public law litigation in the nineteenth century to a constitutionalized 
model in the twentieth century exacerbated the tension between judicial review 
and popular sovereignty. 
 
IV 
Reviving the Polymorphous Model of Public Law Litigation 
 
Given that nineteenth century federal courts applied a polymorphous 
model of public law litigation, is it feasible or desirable to revive that model in the 
twenty-first century? The primary argument in favor of revival can be 
summarized as follows. Judicial review is essential to protect individual rights. 
Popular sovereignty is essential to preserve “government of the people, by the 
people, [and] for the people.”290 Our current constitutionalized system of public 
law litigation sets up a stark choice: either we sacrifice individual rights for 
popular sovereignty, or we sacrifice democratic self-government for the sake of 
                                                 
286
 See supra notes 160-68, 234-35, 249-54, 277-81, and accompanying text. 
287
 With respect to Chinese cases, see supra note 211. With respect to the Louisiana/Florida cases, 
see supra notes 169-71 and 189-200 and accompanying text. 
288
 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (invalidating portions 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
289
 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (restricting the scope 
of Congress’ legislative power under the Spending Clause); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (restricting the scope of Congress’ legislative power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (restricting the scope of Congress’ 
legislative power under the Commerce Clause). 
290
 Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
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individual rights. Since neither option is attractive, it makes sense to identify a 
middle way. The polymorphous model provides a middle way. By reviving that 
model, we can mitigate the tension between individual rights and popular 
sovereignty. 
 
Part Four addresses application of the polymorphous model in the modern 
world. The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section shows that 
international human rights treaties could function as a partial substitute for 
modern constitutional law. The next section discusses three examples to illustrate 
the practical application of the polymorphous model. The final section addresses 
several objections to the project of a twenty-first century revival of the 
polymorphous model. 
 
A. International Human Rights Treaties as a Partial Substitute for 
Constitutional Law 
 
Nineteenth century federal courts applied a combination of treaties, 
customary international law, common law, statutes and constitutional law to 
protect individual rights from government infringement. During the twentieth 
century, treaties, customary international law and common law largely 
disappeared from the menu of options, leaving statutes and constitutional law as 
the primary tools for courts to apply as constraints on government action. In 
theory, advocates of a polymorphous model could attempt to revive older 
traditions involving judicial application of common law or customary 
international law. However, both types of law present difficulties. Revival of a 
nineteenth century common law tradition would require the Supreme Court to 
overrule or reinterpret its decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
291
 Even if 
the Court was willing to do so, common law provides a poor substitute for 
modern constitutional law because there is limited overlap between the rights 
protected by constitutional law and the rights protected by common law.
292
 
 
Customary international law (CIL) may appear to be a better fit because 
CIL incorporates some modern international human rights law,
293
 and there is 
substantial overlap between human rights law and constitutional law. However, 
the extent to which CIL incorporates international human rights law is sharply 
contested.
294
 Moreover, the process for incorporating CIL into domestic law is 
                                                 
291
 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
292
 There is some overlap between common law and constitutional law. For example, in Wise v. 
Withers, 3 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806), the plaintiff brought a trespass action against a federal 
officer who searched his home without a warrant. Modern courts would frame the case as a Fourth 
Amendment violation, but Chief Justice Marshall analysed it as a trespass case. 
293
 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 6, § 702. 
294
 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 
(2000).  
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generally less democratic than the process for incorporating treaties.
295
 Since the 
main purpose of reviving the polymorphous model is to mitigate tension between 
judicial review and popular sovereignty, it makes sense to focus on law that has 
been incorporated into domestic law through a democratic process. Therefore, 
Part Four focuses on international human rights treaties as a partial substitute for 
constitutional law.
296
 It bears emphasis, though, that this article’s emphasis on 
human rights treaties is not intended to disparage judicial reliance on common 
law, CIL, or non-human-rights treaties as part of a broader effort to revive a 
polymorphous model.
297
 
 
The rights protected by human rights treaties are broadly similar to the 
rights protected by federal constitutional law. The First Amendment protects 
freedom of religion;
298
 so does Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).
299
 The Fourth Amendment restricts government 
interference with “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”300 Similarly, Article 17 
of the ICCPR restricts government interference with “privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.”301 The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled confessions,302 as 
does Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to 
counsel,
303
 as do Articles 14(3)(b) and (d) of the ICCPR. The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”304 Similarly, Article 7 of the ICCPR 
and Article 16 of the Torture Convention prohibit “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”305 The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause 
                                                 
295
 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. 
296
 One could argue that human rights treaties ratified by the United States have not been 
incorporated into U.S. law because we ratified the treaties subject to non-self-executing 
declarations. That argument has some merit. However, the better view is that human rights treaties 
ratified by the United States are part of the corpus of federal law, notwithstanding the non-self-
executing declarations. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 144-71 (1999). 
297
 Human rights law is not the only body of international law with rights protection similar to 
federal constitutional law. For example, international rules on expropriation provide protection for 
private property similar to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. See Vicki Been & Joel C. 
Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided 
Quest for an International Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (2003). 
298
 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
299
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
300
 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
301
 ICCPR, supra note 299, art. 17. 
302
 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
303
 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
304
 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
305
 See ICCPR, supra note 299, art. 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Feb. 4, 1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture 
Convention]. 
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or gender,
306
 as do Article 26 of the 
ICCPR, Article 2 of CERD (for racial discrimination),
307
 and Article 2 of 
CEDAW (for gender discrimination).
308
 
 
Despite the substantive overlap, international human rights law does not 
provide a complete substitute for federal constitutional law. Much of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional doctrine involves federalism and separation of powers 
issues. International law has little to say about the appropriate distribution of 
power between federal and state governments, or among the branches of the 
federal government.
309
 Therefore, under a polymorphous model, federalism and 
separation of powers issues would presumably be litigated as constitutional 
claims, not international claims. 
 
Similarly, some individual rights claims would continue to be litigated as 
constitutional claims because federal constitutional law provides stronger 
protection for certain rights than does international law. For example, the Court 
has held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep a gun in 
one’s home for self-defense.310 There is no international law analogue to the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms. Additionally, the Court has construed the 
First Amendment Free Speech Clause to limit the power of state and federal 
governments to regulate campaign finance.
311
 International human rights law does 
protect freedom of expression,
312
 but judicial review of campaign finance laws 
under an international human rights standard would likely be more deferential 
than the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.313 
 
                                                 
306
 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 663-
738 (2d ed. 2002). 
307
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. 
308
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The United States is not a party to CEDAW. However, 
the U.S. is a party to the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the CERD. 
309
 Individual Justices have cited foreign law, not international law, to shed light on constitutional 
federalism issues. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Whereas a comparative constitutional analysis may be helpful in examining certain 
federalism issues, I am not aware of any international legal rules that are especially helpful in this 
regard. 
310
 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008). 
311
 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
312
 See ICCPR, supra note 299, art. 19. 
313
 See generally Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the First 
Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America’s Borders, 25 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 27, 62-
72 (2006). 
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In sum, international human rights law could provide a partial substitute, 
but not a complete substitute, for federal constitutional law. If Congress 
authorized federal courts to apply international human rights treaties, or if judges 
did so without express congressional authorization, the courts could protect many 
rights currently protected under federal constitutional law by applying 
international human rights law as a constraint on government power. Since 
Congress has power to regulate the domestic application of treaties, shifting from 
a constitutional law discourse to an international human rights discourse would 
mitigate the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty by 
facilitating greater legislative participation in creating rules for the domestic 
protection of human rights. The next section discusses three examples to illustrate 
this point.  
    
B. Three Illustrative Examples 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
314
 is a rare case where the Court applied the 
polymorphous model in the twenty-first century. Hamdan involved the trial by 
military commission of an individual detained at Guantanamo Bay. Defendant 
challenged the jurisdiction of the military commission, raising a combination of 
constitutional, common law, statutory, and international law arguments.
315
 The 
Court could potentially have ruled that the commission procedures violated 
Hamdan’s constitutional rights.316 Instead, the Court held that the military 
commission violated rights protected by the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
317
 By resolving the case on statutory and treaty 
grounds,
318
 the Court invited further democratic lawmaking by the political 
branches.
319
 Hence, the Court mitigated the tension between judicial review and 
popular sovereignty by ruling against the government without constraining future 
legislative options.
320
 
 
                                                 
314
 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
315
 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. Nov 08, 2004) (summarizing eight 
counts raised in petition).  
316
 Hamdan alleged that the commission procedures violated the Fifth Amendment. See id. 
317
 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613-35. The Court did not apply the Geneva Conventions directly. 
Instead, the Court reasoned that the government must comply with the Geneva Conventions 
because Congress had incorporated the Convention’s key substantive provisions into the UCMJ by 
its statutory reference to the “law of war.” See id. at 627-28. 
318
 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, also invoked the “common law of war” in support of his 
view that the conspiracy charge against Hamdan should be dismissed. See id. at 595-613. 
319
 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from 
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary. . . . [J]udicial insistence upon 
that consultation [with Congress] . . . strengthens the Nation's ability to determine—through 
democratic means—how best to” address the issues.) 
320
 See Jack Balkin, “Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision,” 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision.html (June 29, 2006). 
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Judicial supremacists may object that the Court abdicated its responsibility 
to protect individual rights because Congress subsequently enacted the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006,
321
 which infringed the due process rights of defendants 
tried by military commission.
322
 However, that legislation was short-lived. After 
the 2008 presidential election, President Obama worked with a Democratic 
Congress to produce the 2009 Military Commissions Act.
323
 Although the 2009 
Act does not provide the full range of procedural rights applicable to criminal 
defendants in federal court, the 2009 Act “addressed a number of key objections 
to the statutory framework Congress and the Bush Administration had crafted in 
2006.”324 Thus, the story of Hamdan and the Military Commissions Act 
demonstrates that judicial supremacy is not always necessary to protect individual 
rights. In some cases, the Court can give Congress the last word without 
sacrificing fundamental rights. 
 
In Miller v. Alabama,
325
 a state court sentenced defendant to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a crime he committed 
at age fourteen. The Alabama statute did not grant the trial judge any discretion to 
impose a lesser sentence. According to the Supreme Court, that lack of discretion 
was critical: for juvenile offenders, the Eighth Amendment requires States to 
accord discretion to trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor, and to 
impose a more lenient sentence in appropriate circumstances.
326
 The Supreme 
Court reversed the sentence, thereby vindicating defendant’s fundamental rights. 
However, by relying on the Eighth Amendment the Court constrained future 
legislative options. Thus, Miller illustrates the classic judicial supremacist 
dilemma. In a system that combines constitutional judicial review with judicial 
supremacy, either individual rights trump popular sovereignty, or popular 
sovereignty trumps individual rights. There does not appear to be a middle way. 
 
Assume, hypothetically, that the defendant in Miller challenged the 
Alabama statute as a violation of his rights under the ICCPR. Article 24(1) 
specifies that “[e]very child shall have . . . the right to such measures of protection 
as are required by his status as a minor.”327 The Human Rights Committee, a 
treaty implementing body created by the ICCPR, has said: “sentencing children to 
[a] life sentence without parole is of itself not in compliance with [A]rticle 
                                                 
321
 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
322
 See, e.g., David Kinley, Human Rights Fundamentalisms, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 545, 556 (2007) 
(asserting that the 2006 statute provides a “grotesque example of rights and liberties breached in 
the name of counter-terrorism”). 
323
 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. A, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2574. 
324
 Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal 
Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 176 (2013). 
325
 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
326
 Id., at 2463-69. 
327
 ICCPR, supra note 299, art. 24(1). 
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24(1).
328
 Thus, just as the Supreme Court construed the Eighth Amendment to 
require state courts to take account of the child’s age in sentencing decisions, it 
could reasonably have construed Article 24 in precisely the same way. Since 
Article 24 is the “supreme Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause, the 
Court could have reversed the conviction by holding that Article 24 preempted 
Alabama law.
329
  
 
A treaty preemption holding would be similar to the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment holding because it would vindicate the defendant’s rights and 
constrain future legislative options at the state level. However, by relying on the 
treaty instead of the Eighth Amendment, the Court would preserve Congress’ 
prerogative to enact legislation authorizing state action inconsistent with the treaty 
(or inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the treaty).330 Therefore, in 
contrast to constitutional law discourse, international human rights discourse 
helps mitigate the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. 
 
Next, consider Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
Dist.
331
 In that case, parents of public school students raised equal protection 
challenges to affirmative action plans adopted by local school districts in Seattle, 
Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky. The Court held that both plans violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because they relied “upon an individual student's race 
in assigning that student to a particular school.”332 The Court’s holding is 
consistent with prior decisions applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications 
                                                 
328
 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).  
329
 The main counterargument is that Article 24 is not judicially enforceable because the United 
States ratified the ICCPR subject to a declaration that the treaty is “not self-executing.” The proper 
interpretation of that declaration is contested. I have argued elsewhere that the declaration should 
be interpreted to limit the opportunities for plaintiffs to raise treaty claims offensively, but 
criminal defendants in state courts – like the defendant in Miller – can invoke the treaty 
defensively. See Sloss, supra note 296. Interpreting the declaration to preclude criminal 
defendants in state courts from raising a treaty preemption defense would raise serious 
constitutional problems. See David Sloss, The Constitutional Right to a Treaty Preemption 
Defense, 40 UNIV. OF TOLEDO L. REV. 971 (2009). 
330
 Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation 
implementing U.S. treaty obligations. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In a case 
currently pending before the Supreme Court, the Court is considering possible federalism 
limitations on Congress’ power to implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See 
Bond v. United States, No. 12-158. Regardless of the Court’s decision in Bond, the Court should 
be hesitant to adopt a constitutional rule prohibiting Congress from enacting legislation to grant 
States broader discretion to adopt laws that might be inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations. 
Such a constitutional rule would be directly at odds with the avowed principles underlying the 
Court’s federalism jurisprudence. 
331
 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
332
 Id. at 710. 
Polymorphous Public Law Litigation 
David Sloss, Draft, January 2014 
 
61 
 
intended to benefit disadvantaged groups.
333
 However, that holding is in tension 
with principles of popular sovereignty and federalism because the Court 
invalidated policies adopted by local decision-makers who were elected by their 
local communities to address issues of local concern.
334
 Whether the Court’s 
interference with local, democratic decision-making was necessary to vindicate 
constitutional rights is debatable.
335
  
 
In contrast to Miller, the Court in Parents Involved could not reasonably 
have based its holding on international human rights law. Both the ICCPR and 
CERD prohibit racial discrimination.
336
 However, Article 1(4) of CERD states: 
“Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement 
of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals . . . shall not be deemed racial 
discrimination . . . .”337 Moreover, international human rights law generally 
recognizes the difference between racial classifications intended to harm 
disfavored minorities (which violate human rights principles), and racial 
classifications intended to benefit disfavored minorities (which do not violate 
human rights principles).
338
 Hence, Parents Involved is a case where international 
human rights law does not provide a substitute for U.S. constitutional law, as 
currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
 
Parents Involved illustrates two key points about the polymorphous 
model. First, under a polymorphous model the Court would invariably apply 
constitutional law to decide some cases because international law does not always 
support the Court’s preferred outcome. Second, contrary to the fears raised by 
international law skeptics,
339
 judicial application of international human rights law 
is not incompatible with local, decentralized decision-making. To the contrary, 
affirmative action is an area where international human rights law would permit a 
large measure of local autonomy, but the Supreme Court — by exercising its 
                                                 
333
 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 306, at 704-09. 
334
 In the Seattle case, the contested plan was adopted by the school district’s Board of Directors, 
which is an elected body. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, Brief for Respondents (Oct. 2006). In the Louisville case, the contested plan was adopted 
by the Jefferson County Board of Education, a body consisting of seven members elected for four-
year terms. See Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, Brief for Respondents (Oct. 
2006). 
335
 For a persuasive argument that the Court’s interference with local decision-making was 
unwarranted, see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
336
 See ICCPR, supra note 299, art. 26; CERD, supra note 307, art. 2. 
337
 CERD, supra note 307, art. 1, para. 4. 
338
 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International 
Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999). 
339
 See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance 
with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 530-31 (2004) (discussing the alleged conflict 
between federalism principles and international human rights law). 
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constitutional lawmaking power — has mandated a uniform federal rule limiting 
the policy options available to state and local governments. 
 
C. Objections to the Polymorphous Model 
This section addresses four key objections to the project of reviving a 
polymorphous model of public law litigation. The objections relate to federalism, 
individual rights, national identity and institutional competence. 
 
1. Federalism: Some scholars assert that judicial application of 
international human rights treaties would undermine federalism. Since human 
rights treaties address matters traditionally regulated by the States, application of 
those treaties by federal courts would shift power from the States to the federal 
government. Hence, the polymorphous model is flawed insofar as it envisions 
judicial application of international human rights treaties.
340
 
 
This objection is without merit. It is difficult to identify a single right 
protected under human rights treaties ratified by the United States that is not 
already regulated at the national level.
341
 Under incorporation doctrine, most 
rights protected by human rights treaties have already been applied to the States 
via incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.
342
 Other rights have been 
nationalized by virtue of federal civil rights legislation.
343
 Accordingly, when the 
United States ratified the ICCPR the federal executive branch told the Senate that 
federal constitutional and statutory law protected virtually of the rights protected 
by the treaty.
344
 The executive branch provided similar assurances regarding the 
CERD and the Torture Convention.
345
 Thus, the federalism objection is 
unfounded because the United States nationalized human rights law in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. 
 
                                                 
340
 See id. 
341
 The federalism objection may have greater force with respect to unratified treaties – especially 
CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Here, I address the objection only insofar 
as it applies to the ICCPR, CERD, and the Torture Convention, the three principal human rights 
treaties ratified by the United States. 
342
 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (specifying a long list of rights protected 
by the Bill of Rights that have been applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
343
 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and rejecting argument that the statute exceeded the scope of national 
power). 
344
 See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Report, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 10 (1992). 
345
 See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-29, at 25-26 (1994); 
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 13-28 (1990). 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has nationalized some rights through 
aggressive constitutional interpretation that would be left primarily to local 
decision-makers under international human rights standards. Examples include 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms,
346
 the First Amendment right to spend 
money on political campaigns,
347
 and the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free 
from affirmative action programs.
348
 If implementation of a polymorphous model 
encouraged the Court to view individual rights issues through an international 
human rights lens, the Court might reevaluate its jurisprudence in these areas and 
conclude that nationalization of some or all of these rights is unwarranted. Thus, 
adoption of a polymorphous model could potentially promote the goals of 
federalism by fostering greater local autonomy on some issues. 
 
2. Individual Rights: Others may object that the polymorphous model 
would weaken protection for individual rights. The model encourages courts to 
decide cases by applying rules that Congress can modify. If courts apply the 
model, there will invariably be cases in which courts issue decisions protecting 
individual rights and Congress overrides those decisions, thereby weakening 
protection for individual rights.
349
 
 
Granted, the possibility of congressional override is an integral feature of 
the polymorphous model. To understand the model fully, though, one must 
consider potential judicial responses to override legislation. In Hamdan, as 
discussed above, Congress overrode the Court’s decision by enacting the Military 
Commissions Acts (MCA).
350
 Currently, criminal defendants in military 
commission proceedings retain the right to challenge the MCA on federal 
constitutional grounds. Thus, the Supreme Court still holds a trump card: in a 
properly presented case, the Court could hold that certain features of the MCA 
violate defendants’ constitutional rights.351 Therefore, by applying a 
polymorphous model and deciding Hamdan on grounds that left open future 
legislative options, the Court did not relinquish its power to invalidate legislation 
that violates constitutional rights. The same will be true, generally, in any case 
where the Court leaves an opening for future legislative deliberation. 
 
                                                 
346
 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
347
 See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text. 
348
 See supra notes 336-38 and accompanying text. 
349
 The Scott Act, passed by Congress in 1888, is one example. The statute was motivated, at least 
in part, by a desire to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Chew Heong v. United 
States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text. 
350
 See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text. 
351
 For example, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 permits admission into evidence of some 
statements obtained by coercive methods. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c). The Supreme Court has not 
ruled on the constitutionality of this provision. 
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This observation raises a further objection. Since the Court’s power to 
invalidate federal legislation gives it the ultimate trump card, the ostensible 
“popular sovereignty” benefits of the polymorphous model are illusory. In the 
end, the Court is presented with a zero-sum choice between individual rights and 
popular sovereignty. If the Court invalidates the MCA, individual rights trump 
popular sovereignty. If the Court upholds the legislation, popular sovereignty 
trumps individual rights. Realistically, there is no third option. Therefore, the 
polymorphous model cannot deliver on its promise to reconcile the tension 
between individual rights and popular sovereignty. 
 
This objection fails to appreciate the benefits of the polymorphous model. 
By deciding a case on the basis of treaty law, the Court gives both Congress and 
itself opportunities for further deliberation. Recall the Court’s decision in Miller 
v. Alabama, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits States from imposing a 
mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence on juvenile offenders.
352
 Under 
the polymorphous model, the Court could have reached the same result by 
applying Article 24 of the ICCPR.
353
 In that case, Congress could have held 
hearings, invited expert testimony, and debated whether to adopt federal 
legislation authorizing States to impose mandatory LWOP sentences, 
notwithstanding the Court’s interpretation of Article 24.354 If Congress decided 
not to enact such legislation, the outcome would be identical to the result in 
Miller, but the process generating that outcome would be more consistent with 
principles of popular sovereignty. If Congress chose to enact legislation 
overriding the Court’s (treaty-based) decision, the Court would retain the power 
to invalidate that legislation. However, in contrast to the actual case, the Court 
would have the benefit of recent congressional deliberations to inform its 
judgment. Thus, the polymorphous model promotes democratic deliberation about 
the appropriate level of protection for human rights and enriches judicial decision-
making by providing courts with additional input from legislative hearings and 
debates. 
 
3. National Identity: Another potential objection to the polymorphous 
model goes something like this. Our national identity as Americans is inextricably 
linked to our shared commitment to the Constitution. Judicial review based on 
constitutional law is a vital expression of our national identity. If U.S. courts 
routinely applied human rights law as a substitute for constitutional law, we 
would be forsaking a core element of our national identity.
355
 
 
                                                 
352
 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 
353
 See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text. 
354
 See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
355
 Professor Rubenfeld has advanced a similar argument. See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and 
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2004). 
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One response to this objection involves history. The analysis in Parts Two 
and Three above demonstrates that federal courts actually applied a polymorphous 
model for much of our nation’s history. Before the Civil War, federal courts 
applied international law much more frequently than they applied constitutional 
law to resolve public law controversies.
356
 Clearly, they did not believe that 
judicial application of international law was “un-American.” To the contrary, the 
Founding generation believed that our nation’s commitment to international law 
was a core element of our national identity.
357
  
 
Granted, in today’s world a shift from judicial reliance on constitutional 
law to greater reliance on international law would involve a change in our self-
perception as Americans. However, that change could have very positive 
repercussions. Many people in other parts of the world view Americans as 
hypocrites. From their standpoint, we use international human rights rhetoric to 
criticize other countries for their failings, but we refuse to subject ourselves to the 
same standards.
358
 A greater judicial willingness to apply international human 
rights standards to evaluate the conduct of domestic government actors could 
enhance the U.S. image in the world and help counter the hypocrisy charge. 
 
4. Institutional Competence: The final objection relates to institutional 
competence. Polling data show that the American public has a very low opinion 
of Congress. According to recent Gallup polls, “[t]hirteen percent of Americans 
approve of the job Congress is doing . . . Congressional approval has rarely been 
20% or higher in the last three years.”359 In contrast, the American public has a 
more favorable opinion of the Supreme Court. “Forty-six percent of Americans 
approve of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job.”360 
 
Suppose the public’s opinion is well-founded. Suppose, in other words, 
that judicial lawmaking by the Supreme Court actually promotes the general 
welfare more effectively than legislative lawmaking by Congress. The 
polymorphous model is designed to transfer power from the Supreme Court to 
Congress. If the Court is really a more competent legislator than Congress, then 
                                                 
356
 See Figure Three supra. 
357
 See David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, The Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
932 (2010). 
358
 See, e.g., “Russia: Human Rights Report Criticizes U.S. and Others,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2011, at A8 (reporting that Russia's Foreign Ministry “singled out the United States” and attacked 
as hypocritical the U.S. human rights record). 
359
 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Congress Job Approval Starts 2014 at 13%” (Jan. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/166838/congress-job-approval-starts-2014.aspx. 
360
 Andrew Dugan, “Americans Still Divided on Approval of U.S. Supreme Court” (Oct. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/165248/americans-still-divided-approval-supreme-
court.aspx  
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transferring power from the Court to Congress would yield a net loss to public 
welfare. 
 
Ultimately, the question of comparative institutional competence is an 
empirical question. Given our nation’s deep-rooted commitment to popular 
sovereignty, those who claim that the Supreme Court has a comparative 
advantage, and who advocate enhanced judicial power on that basis, must produce 
very compelling evidence of the Court’s superior lawmaking ability to justify 
vesting greater legislative power in the Supreme Court. At present, the claim that 
the Supreme Court is a better legislator than Congress remains unproven. 
Moreover, even if advocates of broad judicial power could prove their case 
empirically, the appropriate response would be to devise practical methods to 
improve Congress’ performance, rather than abandoning faith in representative 
democracy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article introduces a conceptual distinction between polymorphous 
public law litigation and constitutionalized public law litigation. The article 
demonstrates that federal courts applied a polymorphous model of public law 
litigation in the nineteenth century. Constitutionalization, by contrast, is a more 
recent development.  
 
The preceding analysis challenges conventional wisdom in four ways. 
First, conventional wisdom holds that public law litigation is a twentieth century 
invention.
361
 The article documents the rich tradition of public law litigation in 
federal courts in the nineteenth century. Second, conventional wisdom holds that 
application of international law to protect individual rights from government 
infringement is a modern departure from traditional international law.
362
 The 
article demonstrates that federal courts in the nineteenth century regularly applied 
international law to protect individual rights from government infringement.  
 
Third, conventional wisdom holds that protection of individual rights from 
government infringement requires judicial application of constitutional law.
363
 
The article shows that federal courts in the nineteenth century provided robust 
protection for individual rights without applying constitutional law. Moreover, the 
article suggests that federal courts in the twenty-first century could protect 
individual rights from government infringement by applying international human 
rights law as a partial substitute for federal constitutional law. 
                                                 
361
 See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 27. 
362
 See, e.g., Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 BOST. COLL INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 213, 253-55 (2008). 
363
 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 24. 
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Fourth, conventional wisdom holds that judicial application of 
international law is anti-democratic.
364
 In contrast, this article contends that the 
combination of constitutionalization and judicial supremacy has exacerbated the 
tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. U.S. lawyers and judges 
could mitigate that tension by relying more on international law, and less on 
constitutional law, to resolve public law controversies. In sum, a twenty-first 
century revival of the nineteenth century tradition of polymorphous public law 
litigation – which includes greater judicial reliance on international law – would 
help move the current, constitutionalized system of public law litigation in a 
direction that would be more consistent with the democratic commitment to 
popular sovereignty. 
                                                 
364
 See, e.g., McGinnis and Somin, supra note 43. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table One Based on phase one data Provides data supporting Figure 1 
Table Two Based on phase two data Provides data supporting Figures 3, 4, 5 
Table Three Based on phase two data Provides data supporting Figure 6 
Table Four Based on phase two data Provides data supporting Figure 7 
Table Five Based on phase two data Provides data supporting Figures 8 & 9 
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Table One 
Summary of Data from Phase One Database 
Data Supporting Figure 1 
 
Period  Chief Justices Years Volumes 
of US 
Reports 
Total # Cases 
in Phase One 
Database 
PG  
(Public Law) 
PP 
(Private Law) 
Other 
1 Marshall 1801-1835 5-34 1219 32-37% 
(386-449) 
61-64% 
(742-778) 
2-5% 
(28-55) 
2 Taney 1836-1864 35-68 1597 25-29% 
(397-467) 
69-72% 
(1109-1144) 
1-4% 
(21-56) 
3 Chase, Waite 1865-1888 69-126 4537 36-38% 
(1657-1726) 
60-63% 
(2740-2852) 
1-3% 
(71-115) 
4 Fuller 1888-1910 127-218 4918 40-44% 
(1960-2178) 
52-54% 
(2576-2663) 
3-6% 
(164-316) 
5 White, Taft, 
Hughes 
1910-1936 219-298 5670 49-54% 
(2763-3070) 
38-40% 
(2158-2281) 
8-12% 
(442-657) 
6 Hughes, Stone, 
Vinson 
1936-1954 299-346  2345 60-70% 
(1418-1649) 
24-25% 
(580-589) 
5-14% 
(116-338) 
7 Warren, Burger 1954-1972 347-408 2329 68-73% 
(1583-1689) 
21% 
(487-494) 
6-11% 
(153-259) 
8 Burger, 
Rehnquist 
1972-2005 409-545 4259 65-70% 
(2790-2968) 
21-22% 
(894-924) 
9-13% 
(397-545 
 
Notes to Table One 
 
1. In the PG column, the higher numbers (and higher percentages) are based directly on the phase 
one database. The lower numbers (and lower percentages) are estimates that account for errors 
identified in phase two. The phase two analysis identified several cases in each time period that 
were incorrectly classified as PG in phase one. 
2. In the PP and “Other” columns, the lower numbers (and lower percentages) are based directly on 
the phase one database. The higher numbers (and higher percentages) are estimates based on 
errors identified in phase two. For each time period, the estimates account for the number of PP 
cases in the phase two database that were incorrectly classified as PG in phase one, and the 
number of “other” cases in the phase two database that were incorrectly classified as PG in phase 
one. 
3. The phase two analysis did not address periods 4 and 5, so the estimates for periods 4 and 5 are 
based on average error rates for other time periods. The average error rates used for periods 4 and 
5 are as follows: 
a. 10 percent of cases classified as PG in phase one are not PG 
b. 4 percent of cases classified as PG in phase one should have been classified as PP 
c. 7 percent of cases classified as PG in phase one should have been classified as Other 
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Table Two 
Data Supporting Figures 3, 4, 5 
 
 Period One 
(1801-1835) 
Period Two 
(1836-1864) 
Period Three 
(1865-1888) 
Period Six 
(1936-1954) 
Period Seven 
(1954-1972) 
Period Eight 
(1972-2005) 
(1) Private Party 
Raised Int’l Law 
Claim  
41.9% 
[34.1, 49.7] 
(N=155) 
41.7% 
[34.1, 49.3] 
(N=163) 
15.6% 
[10.3, 20.9] 
(N=179) 
4.7% 
[1.5, 7.9] 
(N=169) 
.9% 
[0, 2.2] 
(N=215) 
3.0% 
[1.2, 4.8] 
(N=331) 
(2) Private Party 
Raised Con Law 
Claim  
8.4% 
[4.0, 12.8] 
(N=155) 
18.4% 
[12.4, 24.4] 
(N=163) 
18.4% 
[12.7, 24.1] 
(N=179) 
50.9(%) 
[43.3, 58.5] 
(N=169) 
63.3% 
[56.8, 69.8] 
(N=215) 
73.7% 
[69.0, 78.4] 
(N=331) 
(3) Court Below 
Applied Int’l Law 
to Decide Merits 
44.1% 
[35.4, 52.8] 
(N=127) 
46.9% 
[38.7, 55.1] 
(N=143) 
15.7% 
[10.0, 21.4] 
(N=159) 
3.2% 
[0.4, 6.0] 
(N=157) 
1.0% 
[0, 2.4] 
(N=196) 
2.7% 
[0.8 , 4.6] 
(N=291) 
(4) Court Below 
Applied Con Law 
to Decide Merits 
6.3% 
[2.1, 10.5] 
(N=127) 
15.4% 
[9.5, 21.3] 
(N=143) 
16.4% 
[10.6, 22.2] 
(N=159) 
49.0% 
[41.2, 56.8] 
(N=157) 
61.7% 
[54.9, 68.5] 
(N=196) 
68.4% 
[63.0, 73.8] 
(N=291) 
(5) Supreme Ct.  
Applied Int’l Law 
to Decide Merits 
42.5% 
[34.1, 50.9] 
(N=134) 
41.8% 
[33.4, 50.2] 
(N=134) 
15.4% 
[9.7, 21.1] 
(N=156) 
4.1% 
[0.9, 7.3] 
(N=148) 
1.1% 
[0, 2.6] 
(N=187) 
3.8% 
[1.5, 6.1] 
(N=264) 
(6) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Con Law 
to Decide Merits 
9.0% 
[4.1, 13.9] 
(N=134) 
16.4 
[10.1, 22.7] 
(N=134) 
21.2% 
[14.8, 27.6] 
(N=156) 
47.3% 
[39.2, 55.4] 
(N=148) 
58.3% 
[51.2, 65.4] 
(N=187) 
68.2% 
[62.6, 73.8] 
(N=264) 
(7) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Neither 
Int’l Law nor Con 
Law 
52.2% 
[43.7, 60.7] 
(N=134) 
45.5% 
[37.0, 54.0] 
(N=134) 
64.1% 
[56.5, 71.7] 
(N=156) 
50.7% 
[42.6, 58.8] 
(N=148) 
41.2% 
[34.1, 48.3] 
(N=187) 
30.3% 
[24.7, 35.9] 
(N=264) 
 
Notes to Table Two 
 
1. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on which the estimate is based. Numbers in 
brackets show the 95% confidence interval for the estimate. 
2. For rows 1 and 2, N is the total number of cases in the phase two database for each period, after 
eliminating: 1) cases that were not “public law” cases; and 2) cases for which there was 
insufficient information. 
a. For rows 3 and 4, N is the subset of those cases for each period that yielded a decision on 
the merits in the court below. The “court below” is the last court that addressed the case 
before it reached the Supreme Court. 
b. For rows 5-7, N is the subset of those cases for each period that yielded a decision on the 
merits in the Supreme Court.   
 71 
 
Table Three 
Data Supporting Figure 6 
Claims Against Federal Government Actors 
 
 Period One 
(1801-1835) 
Period Two 
(1836-1864) 
Period Three 
(1865-1888) 
Period Six 
(1936-1954) 
Period Seven 
(1954-1972) 
Period Eight 
(1972-2005) 
(1) Private Party 
Raised Int’l Law 
Claim 
43.4% 
[35.2, 51.6] 
(N=143) 
58.0% 
[48.8, 67.2] 
(N=112) 
21.7% 
[14.1, 29.3] 
(N=115) 
4.2% 
[0.6, 7.8] 
(N=120) 
1.7% 
[0, 4.1] 
(N=117) 
2.1% 
[0, 4.4] 
(N=145) 
(2) Private Party 
Raised Con Law 
Claim 
4.9% 
[1.4, 8.4] 
(N=143) 
6.2% 
[1.7, 10.7] 
(N=112) 
6.1% 
[1.7, 10.5] 
(N=115) 
34.2(%) 
[25.7, 42.7] 
(N=120) 
36.8% 
[28.0, 45.6] 
(N=117) 
59.3% 
[51.3, 67.3] 
(N=145) 
(3) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Int’l Law to 
Decide Merits  
44.4% 
[35.6, 53.2] 
(N=124) 
56.5% 
[46.3, 66.7] 
(N=92) 
21.8% 
[13.7, 29.9] 
(N=101) 
5.9% 
[1.3, 10.5] 
(N=102) 
2.0% 
[0, 4.7] 
(N=104) 
2.6% 
[0, 5.5] 
(N=117) 
(4) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Con Law to 
Decide Merits  
5.6% 
[1.5, 9.7] 
(N=124) 
4.3% 
[0.1, 8.5] 
(N=92) 
8.9% 
[3.3, 14.5] 
(N=101) 
28.4% 
[19.6, 37.2] 
(N=102) 
30.8% 
[21.9, 39.7] 
(N=104) 
49.6% 
[40.5, 58.7] 
(N=117) 
(5) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Neither Int’l 
Law Nor Con Law 
53.2% 
[44.4, 62.0] 
(N=124) 
41.3% 
[31.2, 51.4] 
(N=92) 
69.3% 
[60.3, 78.3] 
(N=101) 
68.6% 
[59.6, 77.6] 
(N=102) 
68.3% 
[59.3, 77.3] 
(N=104) 
49.6% 
[40.5, 58.7] 
(N=117) 
 
Notes to Table Three 
 
1. All cases in Table Three are cases in which the private party alleged unlawful conduct by a federal 
government actor.  
2. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on which the estimate is based. Numbers in 
brackets show the 95% confidence interval for the estimate. 
3. For rows 1 and 2, N is the total number of Fed cases in the phase two database for each period, 
after eliminating cases that were not “public law” cases, and cases for which there was insufficient 
information. 
4. For rows 3-5, N is the sub-set of Fed cases for each period that yielded a decision on the merits in 
the Supreme Court. 
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Table Four 
Data Supporting Figure 7 
Claims Against State and Local Government Actors 
 
 Period One 
(1801-1835) 
Period Two 
(1836-1864) 
Period Three 
(1865-1888) 
Period Six 
(1936-1954) 
Period Seven 
(1954-1972) 
Period Eight 
(1972-2005) 
(1) Private Party 
Raised Int’l Law 
Claim 
 5.9% 
[0, 12.4 ] 
(N=51) 
4.7% 
[0, 9.9] 
(N=64) 
6.1% 
[0, 12.9] 
(N=49) 
0 
[0, 2.0] 
(N=98) 
3.5% 
[0.8, 6.2] 
(N=186) 
(2) Private Party 
Raised Con Law 
Claim 
 45.1% 
[31.3, 58.9] 
(N=51) 
40.6% 
[28.5, 52.7] 
(N=64) 
91.8% 
[84.1, 99.5] 
(N=49) 
94.9% 
[90.5, 99.3] 
(N=98) 
84.9% 
[79.7, 90.1] 
(N=186) 
(3) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Int’l Law to 
Decide Merits  
 9.5% 
[0.5, 18.5] 
(N=42) 
3.6% 
[0, 8.6] 
(N=55) 
0 
[0, 4.3] 
(N=46) 
0 
[0, 2.4] 
(N=83) 
4.8% 
[1.3, 8.3] 
(N=147) 
(4) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Con Law to 
Decide Merits  
 42.9% 
[27.8, 58.0] 
(N=42) 
43.6% 
[30.4, 56.8] 
(N=55) 
89.1% 
[80.0, 98.2] 
(N=46) 
92.8% 
[87.2, 98.4] 
(N=83) 
83.0% 
[76.9, 89.1] 
(N=147) 
(5) Supreme Ct. 
Applied Neither Int’l 
Law Nor Con Law 
 54.8% 
[39.6, 70.0] 
(N=42) 
54.5% 
[41.2, 67.8] 
(N=55) 
10.9% 
[1.8, 20.0] 
(N=46) 
7.2% 
[1.6, 12.8] 
(N=83) 
15.0% 
[9.2, 20.8] 
(N=147) 
 
Notes to Table Four 
 
1. All cases in Table Four are cases in which the private party alleged unlawful conduct by a state or 
local government actor.  
2. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on which the estimate is based. Numbers in 
brackets show the 95% confidence interval for the estimate. 
3. For rows 1 and 2, N is the total number of state/local cases in the phase two database for each 
period, after eliminating cases that were not “public law” cases, and cases for which there was 
insufficient information. 
4. For rows 3-5, N is the sub-set of state/local cases for each period that yielded a decision on the 
merits in the Supreme Court. 
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Table Five 
Data Supporting Figures 8 & 9 
 
 Period One 
(1801-1835) 
Period Two 
(1836-1864) 
Period Three 
(1865-1888) 
Period Six 
(1936-1954) 
Period Seven 
(1954-1972) 
Period Eight 
(1972-2005) 
(1) Challenge 
Legislation 
(All Cases) 
7.7% 
[3.5,11.9] 
(N=155) 
15.3% 
[9.8, 20.8] 
(N=163) 
17.3% 
[11.7, 22.9] 
(N=179) 
35.5% 
[28.3, 42.7] 
(N=169) 
28.4% 
[22.4, 34.4] 
(N=215) 
34.4% 
[29.3, 39.5] 
(N=331) 
(2) Counter 
Majoritarian  
Claims (All Cases) 
5.8% 
[2.1, 9.5] 
(N=155) 
12.9% 
[7.7, 18.1] 
(N=163) 
15.1% 
[9.8, 20.4] 
(N=179) 
34.3% 
[27.1, 41.5] 
(N=169) 
28.4% 
[22.4, 34.4] 
(N=215) 
31.7% 
[26.7, 36.7] 
(N=331) 
(3) Majoritarian 
Claims 
(All Cases) 
89.7% 
[84.9, 94.5] 
(N=155) 
79.1% 
[72.8, 85.4] 
(N=163) 
79.3% 
[73.4, 85.2] 
(N=179) 
47.9% 
[40.3, 55.5] 
(N=169) 
36.7% 
[30.2, 43.2] 
(N=215) 
23.6% 
[19.0, 28.2] 
(N=331) 
(4) Challenge 
Legislation 
(Fed Cases) 
2.8% 
[0.1, 5.5] 
(N=143) 
1.8% 
[0, 4.3] 
(N=112) 
4.3% 
[0.6, 8.0] 
(N=115) 
20.0% 
[12.8, 27.2] 
(N=120) 
14.5% 
[8.1, 20.9] 
(N=117) 
21.4% 
[14.7, 28.1] 
(N=145) 
(5) Counter 
Majoritarian 
Claims (Fed Cases) 
2.8% 
[0.1, 5.5] 
(N=143) 
0.9% 
[0, 2.7] 
(N=112) 
4.3% 
[0.6, 8.0] 
(N=115) 
19.2% 
[12.1, 26.3] 
(N=120) 
14.5% 
[8.1, 20.9] 
(N=117) 
21.4% 
[14.7, 28.1] 
(N=145) 
(6) Majoritarian 
Claims 
(Fed Cases) 
95.1% 
[91.6, 98.6] 
(N=143) 
92.9% 
[88.1, 97.7] 
(N=112) 
93.9% 
[89.5, 98.3] 
(N=115) 
65.0% 
[56.4, 73.6] 
(N=120) 
63.2% 
[54.4, 72.0] 
(N=117) 
40.7% 
[32.7, 48.7] 
(N=145) 
(7) Challenge 
Legislation 
(SL Cases) 
 45.1% 
[31.3, 58.9] 
(N=51) 
40.6% 
[28.5, 52.7] 
(N=64) 
73.5% 
[61.0, 86.0] 
(N=49) 
44.9% 
[35.0, 54.8] 
(N=98) 
44.6% 
[37.4, 51.8] 
(N=186) 
(8) Counter 
Majoritarian 
Claims (SL Cases) 
 39.2% 
[25.7, 52.7] 
(N=51) 
34.4% 
[22.7, 46.1] 
(N=64) 
71.4% 
[58.6, 84.2] 
(N=49) 
44.9% 
[35.0, 54.8] 
(N=98) 
39.8% 
[32.7, 46.9] 
(N=186) 
(9) Majoritarian 
Claims 
(SL Cases) 
 49.0% 
[35.1, 62.9] 
(N=51) 
53.1% 
[40.8, 65.4] 
(N=64) 
6.1% 
[0, 12.9] 
(N=49) 
5.1% 
[0.7, 9.5] 
(N=98) 
10.2% 
[5.8, 14.6] 
(N=186) 
 
Notes to Table Five 
 
1. “Fed Cases” are cases in which the private party alleged unlawful conduct by a federal 
government actor. “SL Cases” are cases in which the private party alleged unlawful conduct by a 
state or local government actor. 
2. See Part III.E for definitions of “majoritarian claims” and “countermajoritarian claims.” 
3. For rows 1, 4, and 7, a case counts as “challenge legislation” if a private party challenged the 
validity of legislation adopted by a federal, state, or local legislature. 
4. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on which the estimate is based. Numbers in 
brackets show the 95% confidence interval for the estimate. 
5. For rows 1-3, N is the total number of cases in the phase two database for each period, after 
eliminating: 1) cases that were not “public law” cases; and 2) cases for which there was 
insufficient information. 
a. For rows 4-6, N is the subset of those cases that count as “Fed Cases.” 
b. For rows 7-9, N is the subset of those cases that count as “SL Cases.” 
6. All data in Table Five is based on private party claims, not judicial decisions. 
 
